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ABSTRACT
This Article offers an analysis of the relationship between Puerto Rico and the
United States that, unlike most of the existing literature, goes beyond discussions of
the jurisprudence of U.S. courts. It also avoids providing merely descriptive or
justificatory accounts of the status quo. Using the tools of constitutional theory, we
seek to describe the nature of what we call the “basic structure of territoriality,” the
way that structure reproduces itself, and the possibility of its replacement. The basic
structure of territoriality, we argue, is comprised by ten fundamental legal rules and
five principles. Although those principles are not legally enforceable, they inform in
important ways the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States. Whenever
the island or the U.S. Government take any action that contradicts them, a tension
underlying the basic structure of territoriality is brought to the surface—the tension
between U.S. legal sovereignty over the island and Puerto Rican historical claims to
political sovereignty. The Article concludes with a series of thought experiments that
allow us to address the question of the identity of Puerto Rico’s constituent subject.
We argue that the answer to that question is not to be found in the fundamental legal
rules of the relationship but, rather, depend on who is able to effectively (and
unilaterally) replace the basic structure of territoriality. As of now, it seems that that
entity is the U.S. Congress, whose power under the Territorial Clause of the U.S.
Constitution would even allow it to “dispose” of the territory without the consent (and
even with the objection) of Puerto Rico. That does not mean, however, that such a
situation will (or should) continue indefinitely.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When lawyers examine Puerto Rico’s territorial status, they usually focus on the
jurisprudence of U.S. courts. They describe, for example, the development of the
distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories, 1 the extent to which
the U.S. Constitution applies in the latter,2 the effect of the extension of U.S.

1 See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (determining that “the island of Porto
Rico is a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United
States within the revenue clauses of the Constitution”). For a recent discussion, see Juan R.
Torruella, Why Puerto Rico Does Not Need Further Experimentation with its Future: A Reply
to the Notion of ‘Territorial Federalism,’ 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 65, 74 (2018).
2 See Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (expressing that the U.S.
Constitution “is in force in Porto Rico as it is wherever and whenever the sovereign power of
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citizenship to Puerto Ricans in 1917,3 or the place of the so-called Insular Cases in
U.S. constitutional law.4 Other works denounce the most dramatic interventions of the
federal government in the island,5 and some offer more or less justificatory accounts
of the territorial relationship by providing novel ways of understanding it (some of the
most recent attempts do so by developing concepts such as “compacted sovereignty,”6
“territorial federalism,”7 or “federacy”8). This Article’s point of departure is that
despite the many insights those types of analyses can bring to the understanding of the
nature of a territory under U.S. law, they barely touch on the problem presented by
territoriality. This is most clearly illustrated by the fact that no decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court, from Downes9 to Sanchez Valle,10 or any of the recent interventions
of the United States in the regulation of the island’s finances, has changed in any way
the fact that the U.S. Congress has the power to legislate for the island. And that is the
problem of territoriality or, to use more international terminology, this is why the
territorial problem is a colonial problem. It is thus surprising to still see legal analyses
of Puerto Rico’s territorial status (particularly those that seek to defend slightly

that government is exerted,” but that not all of its provisions and limitations apply everywhere);
see, e.g., FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE
CONSTITUTION 11–12 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
3 See Balzac, 258 U.S. at 305 (determining that the extension of U.S. citizenship through the
Jones Act did not have the effect of incorporating Puerto Rico into the U.S.).
4 See Gerald L. Neuman & Tomiko Brown-Nagin, RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES: THE
PAST AND FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE xiii (2015); Efrén Rivera Ramos, The Legal
Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JURÍDICA
U.P.R. 224, 228 (1996); JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 45 (1985); see also Aziz Rana, How We Study the
Constitution: Rethinking the Insular Cases and Modern American Empire, 130 YALE L.J.F. 312,
313 (2020).
5 See Dean Delasadas, La Promesa Cumplida [The Promise Fulfilled]: How the U.S.
Constitution has Enabled Colonialism, 67 CATH. U. L. REV. 761, 764 (2018) (arguing that
“PROMESA is one of many examples of how Congress has wielded [its] power to treat the U.S.
Territories as colonies and thereby betray the United States’ democratic values”).
6 See Samuel Issacharoff et. al., What is Puerto Rico?, 94 IND. L.J. 1, 36 (2019) (arguing that
the concept of compacted sovereignty “capture[s] the notion of subordination of Puerto Rico,
but subordination entered into by virtue of an exercise of popular sovereignty”).
7 Territorial Federalism, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1632, 1653 (2017) (emphasis omitted) (arguing
that the relationship has developed toward a status of territorial federalism which would require
courts to “actively scrutinize congressional intervention in territorial self-governance”).
8 David A. Rezvani, The Basis of Puerto Rico’s Constitutional Status: Colony, Compact, or
“Federacy”?, 122 POL. SCI. Q. 115, 116–17 (2007) (arguing that Puerto Rico is a federacy, “a
territory within the international legal boundaries of a state that has been allocated some
entrenched (very difficult to take away) final decision-making powers without being a member
unit of a federation”).
9 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901).
10 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 U.S. 1863, 1876–77 (2016).
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reformed versions of the status quo) proceed as if the routine applicability of ordinary
federal laws in the island, despite the lack of voting representation in the U.S.
Congress, was only occasionally an issue. Consider the following passage, contained
in a recent and sophisticated law review article on the subject:
[Residents of Puerto Rico] are entitled to self-government yet cannot vote in
elections for federal office in the United States, save in U.S. presidential
primaries. But Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens, and at the same time popularly
elect their own governor and bicameral legislature to control local
government. Puerto Ricans are holders of American passports, can enter the
United States freely, and may establish residency and voting eligibility upon
disembarking without customs or special legal barriers. The United States
manages Puerto Rico’s foreign affairs and defense, but Puerto Rico sends its
own team to the Olympics. Puerto Ricans fight in the U.S. military and are
represented by the federal government in the United Nations. Puerto Ricans
pay no federal taxes yet are eligible for federal benefits, with twenty-four
percent of the island’s population currently drawing Social Security benefits,
a higher percentage than almost any U.S. state. Indeed, prior to Hurricane
Maria, nearly half the island’s population was on Medicaid. More
incongruous still is the application of federal economic regulations to Puerto
Rico. Under the Jones Act, any shipping between U.S. ports must be on U.S.flagged ships, which not only raises the cost of goods brought to Puerto Rico
but also prevents the island from transitioning to natural gas . . . . The
application of U.S. minimum wage laws to Puerto Rico results in labor costs
roughly double those in Puerto Rico’s Caribbean counterparts and has been
estimated to reduce employment on the island by eight to ten percent.11
While all of those statements are accurate,12 a reader unfamiliar with the nature of
the territorial relationship would be forgiven for thinking that Puerto Rico enjoys a
unique system of internal self-government (it has exactly the same as a U.S. state),
that in virtue of some special arrangement the United States manages its foreign affairs
and defense (there is no such special arrangement, the U.S. government plays exactly
the same role in the island’s “foreign affairs” and “defense” as it does with respect of
North Dakota or Alabama),13 and that for some historical reason U.S. minimum wage

11 Issacharoff et al., supra note 6, at 6–7. The reader of that article has to wait until footnote
155 to learn “literally hundreds” of federal laws apply in the island. Id. at 26.
12 The non-payment of federal income tax does not imply a lack of contribution to the federal
treasury. See United States v. Vaello-Madero, 356 F.3d 12, 24 (1st Cir. 2019) (noting that “[t]he
residents of Puerto Rico not only make substantial contributions to the federal treasury, but in
fact have consistently made them in higher amounts than taxpayers in at least six states, as well
as the territory of the Northern Mariana Islands. From 1998 to 2006, when Puerto Rico was hit
by its present economic recession, Puerto Rico consistently contributed more than $4 billion
annually in federal taxes and impositions into the national fisc.”).
13 The fact that the International Olympic Committee allows Puerto Rico to participate in this
competition is of little or no relevance to understand Puerto Rico’s territorial status, just as the
fact that the European Broadcasting Union allows Australia to participate in the Eurovision song
contest, although it is outside the European Broadcasting Area, is irrelevant to Australia’s
political status.
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laws and some maritime trade requirements apply in Puerto Rico (the general rule is
that, in addition to those U.S. laws that only apply to Puerto Rico, all U.S. federal laws
apply in the territory as they do in the states).14
Our objective in this Article is to go beyond traditional jurisprudential, critical, and
justificatory approaches of the territorial relationship and, instead, to provide a
theoretical framework that identifies its main features, the way they relate to each
other, and the manners in which they have been (and may be) challenged. We begin
by identifying what we will call the basic structure of territoriality. That basic
structure is comprised of a series of fundamental legal rules and principles whose
violation or non-realization brings to the surface a tension that lies at the basis of the
current territorial status. Every time that tension resurfaces, the colonial relationship
is put under strain. The tension is this: Puerto Ricans have historically seen themselves
as possessing ultimate authority over the island (an idea usually presented in terms of
the right to self-determination), while the U.S. Congress exercises a seemingly
unlimited law-making power over Puerto Rico in light of the Territorial Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.15
Although these two perspectives are ultimately inconsistent with each other, they
are able to co-exist because they operate in different conceptual spheres. That is to
say, Puerto Ricans have historically claimed ultimate political sovereignty over the
island; the U.S. claims legal sovereignty over it. Claims of Puerto Rican political
sovereignty sometimes find their way into the legal system but are mostly made at the
level of political discourse. The process that led to the creation of the Constitution of
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in 1952, as we will see, is full of examples. Claims
of U.S. legal sovereignty, on the contrary, are sometimes explicitly made at the level
of U.S. constitutional law (in judgments and other official documents) but, more
generally, are simply reflected in the territorial status itself, i.e., in the U.S. Congress’
authority to create ordinary and constitutional law for the island.
In Parts II and III, we argue that the basic structure of the relationship between
Puerto Rico and the United States is comprised of ten fundamental legal rules and five
principles. In Part IV, we consider in more detail the distinction made above between
claims to political and legal sovereignty. We also identify a number of governmental
acts (some originating in the United States and others in Puerto Rico)16 that, by failing

14 See United States v. Acosta-Martínez, 252 F.3d 13, 18 (2001) (noting that “the default rule
for questions under the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act is that, as a general matter, a federal
statute does apply to Puerto Rico”). See infra Part II for examination of the rules establishing
the application of U.S. laws in the island.
15 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States; . . . .”). The U.S. Congress’ law-making power is of course limited in different
ways by the U.S. Constitution, and (barring a constitutional amendment) there are thus some
types of laws that it would be unable to validly enact (whether for the United States, for Puerto
Rico, or for any other territory). Those limits, however, are constitutional restrictions originating
in U.S. domestic constitutional law that have little to do with United States-Puerto Rico
relations.
16 These are: President Truman’s veto of the 1946 referendum law, the decision that the U.S.
Federal Death Penalty Act applied in Puerto Rico, the holding of the 2012 referendum by the
government of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth of Puerto
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to realize the principles that comprise the basic structure of territoriality, have brought
the tension between political and legal sovereignty to the surface, and put the
relationship under strain. By this, we do not mean that those acts will lead (or have
led) to a decisive reaction (i.e., that the relationship will change or become
unsustainable), but simply that the internal contradictions and injustices of the basic
structure of territoriality become more visible. Building on this analysis, in Part V we
consider some of the problems that would be present in an attempt to formally replace
that basic structure. We do so by considering the place of constituent power (and the
limits of constitutional change) in the context of the relationship between Puerto Rico
and the U.S. through three thought experiments. Part V concludes.
II. THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF TERRITORIALITY
In comparative constitutional law, the idea of the “basic structure” is usually
associated to a doctrine, developed in India in the 1960s and 1970s, according to which
the power of the legislature to amend the constitution according to the established
procedures does not include the authority to change the constitution’s identity.17 This
approach has been applied various times in India to strike down constitutional
amendments that violated basic features of the Indian constitutional order, such as the
separation of powers, secularism, and judicial independence. 18 Since its appearance
in India, the basic structure doctrine has migrated to various other countries such as
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Kenya, Peru, and Slovakia.19 Scholars have also considered the
potential application of the basic structure doctrine at the U.S. state level.20
The main idea behind the doctrine is that there are some features that arise from a
structural reading of a constitutional charter that are so tied to its identity that their
abandonment would result in the creation of an entirely different constitution. In other
words, the doctrine assumes that “every constitutional arrangement is based upon a
set of core principles which cannot be changed and which can be regarded as intrinsic
to its specific identity . . . . These superconstitutional provisions could be referred to
as the genetic code of the constitutional arrangement.”21 It has been argued that the
notion of the basic structure gives “coherence to the Constitution and make[s] it an

Rico v. Sánchez Valle, the adoption of PROMESA, and the 2021 U.S. Department of Justice
report on the Puerto Rican Self-Determination Act. See infra Part IV for discussion.
17 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 (India).
18 See generally SUDHIR KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INDIA: A
BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE (2d ed. 2011) (showing deep analysis of the basic
structure doctrine in India).
STUDY OF THE

19 See, e.g., Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments – The Migration and
Success of a Constitutional Idea, 61 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 657, 684–85, 694–96, 708–09 (2013).
20 See generally Manoj Mate, State Constitutions and the Basic Structure Doctrine, 45
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 441 (2014).
21 Carlo Fusaro & Dawn Oliver, Towards a Theory of Constitutional Change, in HOW
CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 405, 428 (Carlo Fusaro & Dawn Oliver eds.,
2011).
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organic whole.”22 The unamendability of these core features (which, as noted earlier,
usually include things such as the separation of powers, secularism, and judicial
independence, but also the democratic form of government, and the recognition of
certain rights and freedoms),23 is sometimes seen as reflecting a decision to remain
faithful to a particular constitutional identity.24 These features can take the form of
written fundamental rules (e.g., a rule prohibiting torture or requiring that all members
of a legislature are elected), of principles implicit in fundamental rules contained in a
constitutional text (e.g., the principle of the separation of powers), and they can also
be expressly protected from the amending authority through an eternity clause.
The relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States has its own basic
structure.25 The purpose of this Part is to unearth the features that comprise it. This
involves, first, the identification of the fundamental legal rules that regulate the
relationship between the island and the United States and, second, the identification
of the principles that are implicit in those fundamental legal rules and the manner
through which they have been applied throughout history. The rules that regulate the
territorial relationship are legally enforceable and establish prohibitions and
authorizations that are either violated or complied with. The principles, in contrast,
demand that the territorial system constantly moves in a certain direction but do not
require a specific result.26 Every now and then, the full realization of these principles
is prevented by acts originating either in the United States or in Puerto Rico. As
demonstrated in Part IV, the failure to respect those principles puts the current colonial

22 Dietrich Conrad, Basic Structure of the Constitution and Constitutional Principles, in LAW
186, 199 (Soli J. Sorabjee ed., 2003).

AND JUSTICE: AN ANTHOLOGY

23 Territorial integrity is often regarded as an essential feature included withing a
constitution’s basic structure. From a constitutional theory point of view, territory is one of the
elements that make a state and is an important element of state authority. Sometimes the
territorial integrity is even designed as an eternal or unamendable principle in the constitution.
Consider Ukraine, for example. The Constitution of 1996 emphasizes the territorial unity of
Ukraine and defines Crimea as an inseparable constituent part of Ukraine. UKRAYNSKA
KONSTITUZIYA art. 135, cl. 2 & art. 157, cl. 1 (Ukr.). See Yaniv Roznai & Silvia Suteu, The
Eternal Territory? The Crimean Crisis and Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity as an Unamendable
Constitutional Principle, 16 GERMAN L.J. 542, 545 (2015) for discussion on how this
unamendability plays in the context of the Crimea crisis. See also Rivka Weill, Secession and
the Prevalence of Both Militant Democracy and Eternity Clauses Worldwide, 40 CARDOZO L.
REV. 905, 942–43 (2018); Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, From Catalonia to California:
Secession in Constitutional Law, 70 ALA. L. REV. 923, 935–36 (2019).
24 GARY J. JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 325–37 (2010).
25 The notion of the basic structure of the territorial relationship between Puerto Rico and the
United States is related to, but should not be confused with, the “constitution” of the island, that
is, the set of entrenched constitutional rules that actually regulate the exercise of power in the
island that go well beyond the Constitution of 1952. See Joel I. Colón-Ríos, The Constitution of
Puerto Rico, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CARIBBEAN CONSTITUTIONS 391–392 (Richard
Albert et al. eds., 2020).
26 See Ronald M. Dworkin, Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 25–26 (1967) (arguing
that rules “are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion[,]” while a principle “states a reason that
argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular decision”).
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relationship under strain, bringing to the surface the tension between legal and political
sovereignty. The full abandonment of these principles—even if the abovementioned
fundamental legal rules remain intact—would change the basic structure of
territoriality and therefore result in either a more intense form of colonialism or in a
successful exercise of self-determination.
A.

Fundamental Legal Rules

The basic structure of the current territorial relationship between Puerto Rico and
the United States is inseparable from a series of rules contained in various laws. The
first of those is Public Law 600, adopted on 3 July 1950.27 This was the U.S. law that
authorized the island’s legislature to call a “Constitutional Convention” that would
draft a constitution subject to popular ratification by the Puerto Rican electorate. In
Section 1, Public Law 600 established: “[F]ully recognizing the principle of
government by consent, this Act is now adopted in the nature of a compact so that the
people of Puerto Rico may organize a government pursuant to a constitution of their
own adoption.” Section 2 further added that it “shall provide a republican form of
government and shall include a bill of rights.” According to Section 5 of Public Law
600, the Jones Act of 1917,28 with the exception of the provisions related to the
structure of the island’s internal government (which would cease to apply once the
new constitution came into effect), would continue in force and would be referred to
as the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act (PRFRA).
One of the repealed provisions of the Jones Act was contained in Section 34: “All
laws enacted by the Legislature of Porto Rico shall be reported to the Congress of the
United States, as provided in section twenty-three of this Act, which hereby reserves
the power and authority to annul the same.” Although the U.S. Congress’ power under
Section 34 was never exercised (in contrast to the ultimate veto power granted by that
section to the U.S. President over bills approved by the Puerto Rican legislature),29 it
was considered particularly problematic by some in Puerto Rico, to the point that,
during the debates at the Constituent Convention (the phrase “Constitutional
Convention” was translated to Spanish as “Convención Constituyente”), its repeal was
presented by some delegates as evidence of a fundamental change in the territorial
relationship. For example, Delegate Benjamín Ortiz argued that there were two aspects
of Public Law 600 that suggested that the United States had transferred to Puerto Rico
some “ingredients of sovereignty:” (1) the fact that “the [article of the PRFRA] that
says that Congress has the power to derogate our laws has been specifically repealed;”

27 Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81–600, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319. The territorial relationship
did not start in 1950 but in 1898 with the signing of the Treaty of Paris by Spain and the United
States. Treaty of Peace, Spain–U.S., Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754. See Colón-Ríos, supra note
25, at 392 for a recent account of the development of the relationship since 1898.
28 Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 64–368, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917). The
Jones Act was an organic law adopted by the U.S. Congress that served as Puerto Rico’s second
written constitution since 1900 (when the Foraker Act was adopted). Puerto Rico Civil Code,
Pub. L. No. 56–191, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900).
29 See infra Part V.
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and (2) the fact that Public Law 600 states that it has been adopted “in the nature of a
compact.”30
Governor Luis Muñoz Marín, in his capacity as a Constituent Convention delegate,
went further, arguing that given that the U.S. Congress had not exercised its powers
under Section 34, “the colonial system had in practice ceased to exist a long time ago;”
Public Law 600 merely transformed that reality into law.31 Moreover, according to
Muñoz-Marín, not only had the U.S. Congress failed to exercise those legal powers,
but it was so clear that it would never do it (in light of the moral force of democratic
considerations) that in reality it was as if they did not exist in law even before they
were formally repealed.32 However, among the provisions of the Jones Act that would
continue to apply was Section 9, which stated: “[t]he statutory laws of the United
States not locally inapplicable,33 except as hereinbefore or hereinafter otherwise
provided, shall have the same force and effect in Porto Rico as in the United States,
except the internal revenue laws . . . .”34 The same was the case with the provision of
the Jones Act that maintained that “all citizens of Porto Rico” who were not “citizens
of any foreign country, are hereby declared, and shall be deemed and held to be,
citizens of the United States.”35

30 DIARIO DE SESIONES: PROCIDIMIENTOS Y DEBATES DE LA CONVENCIÓN CONSTITUYENTE DE
PUERTO RICO 528 (1961) [hereinafter DIARIO].
31Id. at 1465–66.
32 Id. at 1466. Muñoz Marín can be understood here as describing what in the English
constitutional tradition is known as a “constitutional convention” (i.e. a politically binding
custom). If a custom had developed requiring the non-applicability of federal statutes in the
island, the colonial character of the territorial relationship between Puerto Rico and the United
States would have been greatly ameliorated: Puerto Rico would have had a status similar to
British “dominions” during the first part of the 20th century. See Peter C. Oliver, “Dominion
Status”: History, Framework and Context, 17 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1173, 1173 (2020) for a
discussion of the development of the “dominion status” under the British Empire.
33 The meaning of the phrase “locally inapplicable” in Section 9 of the PRFRA is not settled.
In fact, there have been a number of scholarly attempts at developing tests that would
significantly limit the number of federal statutes that apply in Puerto Rico. None of those
attempts have been successful, and the reality is that most federal laws apply in the island,
regardless of whether the U.S. Congress has expressly indicated so. See Jasmine B. Gonzalez
Rose, The Exclusion of Non-English Speaking Jurors: Remedying a Century of Denial of the
Sixth Amendment in the Federal Courts of Puerto Rico, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 497, 536
(2011) (explaining that “[t]here is no settled rule to determine whether a federal statute is locally
inapplicable to Puerto Rico”); Elizabeth Vicens, Note, Application of the Federal Death Penalty
Act to Puerto Rico: A New Test for the Locally Inapplicable Standard, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 350,
353, 363–64 (2005) (proposing a model of statutory interpretation that would require courts to
consider whether there is an “overriding local interest that weighs against application” of a
federal law in the island, and stating that “Puerto Rico has been treated as a state with respect
to most federal laws.”).
34 Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 64–368, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917).
35 In 1952, the U.S. Congress passed legislation granting birthright citizenship to persons
born in the island: “All persons born in Puerto Rico on or after January 13, 1941, and subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States, are citizens of the United States at birth.” 8 U.S.C. § 1402.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2022

9

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

288

[70:279

Four key rules emerge from Public Law 600 (in combination with the PRFRA):
(R1) Puerto Rico has the right to organize a government pursuant to their own
constitution; (R2) the Puerto Rican government must be republican in form and be
subject to a constitutional bill of rights; (R3) with the exception of internal revenue
laws, U.S. federal laws, unless locally inapplicable, apply in Puerto Rico; and (R4)
individuals born in the island are U.S. citizens. In addition to these rules, we also need
to consider a series of provisions contained in the constitution adopted under the
framework established by Public Law 600. These rules are not constitutive of the
relationship but protect it. They take the form of an “eternity clause” required by the
U.S. Congress as a condition for the entering into force of the Amendment Rule of the
Constitution of 1952. A few months after the draft constitution was ratified by the
Puerto Rican electorate, the U.S. Congress issued a resolution approving most of the
text, but also requiring a number of changes.36 The federal legislature, for example,
refused to approve Section 20 of the Bill of Rights, which listed a series of (explicitly
non-justiciable) social and economic rights.37 It also required a change in the
constitution’s Amendment Rule: it would not have any effect until the following
eternity clause was added (as Section 3 of Article VII):
Any amendment or revision of this constitution shall be consistent with the
resolution enacted by the Congress of the United States approving the
constitution, with the applicable provisions of the Constitution of the United
States, with the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, and with Public Law
600, Eighty-first Congress, adopted in the nature of a compact[.]
The resolution also stated that the draft constitution would come into effect “when
the Constitutional Convention of Puerto Rico shall have declared in a formal
resolution its acceptance in the name of the people of Puerto Rico of the conditions of
approval” established by the U.S. Congress.38 The Constituent Convention
reconvened on July 7th, 1952 to consider those conditions. A few days later, it issued
its Resolution No. 34, accepting the changes required by the U.S. Congress. In the
general election of November 1952, these changes were ratified by the electorate.39
Regarding the modifications to the Amendment Rule, the resolution stated that “it was
always understood by the people of Puerto Rico” that “amendments to the Constitution
would have to be adopted in conformity with the fundamental provisions embodied in

36 Act of July 3, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82–447, ch. 567, 66 Stat. 327. Justice Breyer, in his dissent
(joined by Justice Sotomayor), described these as “minor amendments” to the draft
constitutional change. Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59, 87 (2016) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
37 These rights were largely inspired in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
proclaimed by the U.N. General Assembly a few years earlier. See generally G.A. Res. 217 (III)
A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948). The U.S. Congress also
determined that Section 5 of Article II would not come into force until a constitutional
amendment was adopted so that it would be clear that a provision regarding compulsory
education in public schools would not apply in those cases where education was being received
in private institutions. Act of July 3, 1952.
38 Act of July 3, 1952.
39 Colón-Ríos, supra note 25, at 406.
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the Compact agreed upon between the people of Puerto Rico and the Congress of the
United States.”40 Importantly, the draft constitution already contained an eternity
clause which prohibited the alteration of the republican form of government and of the
Bill of Rights. That eternity clause, however, only applied to amendments (that is,
proposals that originate in the ordinary legislature) and not to revisions (proposals that
originate in a Constituent Convention called under Article VII).41 In contrast, the U.S.
Congress’ mandated the eternity clause would also apply to a future Constituent
Convention.
Three fundamental legal rules emerge from Section 3, Article VII of the
Constitution of 1952: (R5) The power to reform the constitutional text, even when
exercised by a Constituent Convention, is permanently subject to a series of material
limits contained in the resolution approving the draft constitution and in Public Law
600 (those limits would prohibit, for example, the reinsertion into the constitutional
text of the rejected social and economic rights provisions);42 (R6) the content of the
Constitution of 1952 must always be consistent with that of the U.S. Constitution; and
(R7) the power to reform the constitution cannot be used to change any of the
fundamental legal rules that regulate the relationship between the United States and
Puerto Rico.43

40 Id. at 405.
41 Puerto Rico’s Constitution states:
The Legislative Assembly may propose amendments to this Constitution by a
concurrent resolution approved by not less than two-thirds of the total number of
members of which each house is composed. [ . . . ] Each proposed amendment shall
be voted on separately and not more than three proposed amendments may be
submitted at the same referendum[;]
The Legislative Assembly, by a concurrent resolution approved by two-thirds of the
total number of members of which each house is composed, may submit to the
qualified electors at a referendum, held at the same time as a general election, the
question of whether a constitutional convention shall be called to revise this
Constitution. [ . . . ] Every revision of this Constitution shall be submitted to the
qualified electors at a special referendum for ratification or rejection by a majority of
the votes cast at the referendum[;]
No amendment to this Constitution shall alter the republican form of government
established by it or abolish its Bill of Rights. Any amendment or revision of this
Constitution shall be consistent with the resolution enacted by the Congress of the
United States approving this Constitution, with the applicable provisions of the
Constitution of the United States, with the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, and
with Public Law 600, of the Eighty-first Congress, adopted in the nature of a compact.
P.R. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1–3.
42 The U.S. Supreme Court recently recognized this point: “Before giving its approval,
Congress removed a provision recognizing various social welfare rights (including entitlements
to food, housing, medical care, and employment); added a sentence prohibiting certain
constitutional amendments, including any that would restore the welfare-rights section[.]”
Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59, 64 (2016).
43 P.R. CONST. art. VII, § 3.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2022

11

290

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[70:279

The final three rules to be considered legalize further the subordination of Puerto
Rican law to federal laws and regulations and indirectly deprive Puerto Ricans of
political rights at the U.S. federal level. They originate in the U.S. Constitution. 44 It is
not entirely clear which exact provisions of the U.S. Constitution apply in the island,
but among the ones which application is not in doubt is of course the Territorial Clause
contained in its Article IV, Section 3: “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States . . . .”45 It is often said that, in virtue of the Territorial
Clause, the U.S. Congress has “plenary powers”46 over the island, but this is only true
in a manner of speaking. The U.S. Congress is a limited legislature, and there are
certain types of laws that it is just not constitutionally allowed to adopt. For example,
the U.S. Congress could not validly enact legislation establishing an official religion
in the island or making it illegal to publish a newspaper in Puerto Rico. 47

44 See Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (holding that “[t]he Constitution of
the United States is in force in Porto Rico as it is wherever and whenever the sovereign power
of that government is exerted[,]” but that not all of its provisions and limitations apply
everywhere). There are some provisions of the U.S. Constitution that may not apply in Puerto
Rico in the same way they do in the states, but many of them do (as determined by U.S. federal
courts in numerous cases). See, e.g., In re Conde Vidal, 818 F.3d 765, 766 (1st Cir. 2016)
(holding that the rights to due process and equal protection, as protected by the 14th and 5th
Amendments, “have already been incorporated as to Puerto Rico[]”); Trailer Marine Transp.
Corp. v. Rivera, 977 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that “Puerto Rico is subject to the
constraints of the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine in the same fashion as the states[]”);
Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 330–31 (1986) (examining the
constitutionality of an Act of the Puerto Rican legislature in light of the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 471 (1979) (concluding that the Fourth
Amendment’s restrictions on searches and seizures apply in Puerto Rico); see also David M.
Helfeld, How Much of the U.S. Constitution & Statutes Are Applicable to the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico?, in APPLICABILITY OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION & FEDERAL LAWS TO THE
COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, 110 F.R.D. 449, 452 (1986).
45 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
46 In Downes, the U.S. Supreme Court (speaking through Justice Brown) expressed that the
U.S. Congress’ “general and plenary” power was limited by “certain principles of natural justice
inherent in the Anglo-Saxon character, which need no expression in constitutions or statutes to
give them effect or to secure dependencies against legislation manifestly hostile to their real
interests.” Moreover, the Court suggested (in obiter) that those constitutional prohibitions that
“go to the very root of the power of Congress to act at all, irrespective of time or place” might
have direct application in the island. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 268, 277, 280 (1901).
Some years later in Balzac, the Court noted that “[t]he guarant[e]es of certain fundamental
personal rights declared in the Constitution, as, for instance, that no person could be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, had from the beginning full application
in the Philippines and Porto Rico[.]” Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1922).
47 See, e.g., First Nat. Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 132–33 (1879) (“The
organic law of a Territory takes the place of a constitution as the fundamental law of the local
government. It is obligatory on and binds the territorial authorities; but Congress is supreme,
and for the purposes of this department of its governmental authority has all the powers of the
people of the United States, except such as have been expressly or by implication reserved in
the prohibitions of the Constitution.”).
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What is clear, however, is that the U.S. Congress is able to do things to a territory
that it would not be able to do to a state, such as discriminating against it as long as
there is a rational basis to do so.48 The applicability in the island of the Supremacy
Clause (and, as a result, of the doctrine of preemption) is not in question either.49
Finally, the constitutional provisions that relate to the election of the members of the
U.S. House of Representatives (Article I, Section 2) and the U.S. Senate (Article 1,
Section 3), as well as those related to the Presidential election (Article II, Section 1),
mean that Puerto Ricans lack voting representation in the United States,50 and do not
participate in the election of the President. There are thus three more fundamental legal
rules to add to our list: (R8) The U.S. Congress is not always required to treat Puerto
Rico as a state; (R9) in virtue of the doctrine of preemption, laws adopted by the Puerto
Rican legislature will be invalid when in conflict with federal laws; and (R10) Puerto
Ricans living in the island lack full political rights in the U.S. political system.
B.

The Principles of Territoriality

The distinction between rules and principles is well established in the literature.
As Ronald Dworkin has written, “[r]ules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion.”51
Rules are legal directives that by their design require strict compliance. Questions
about whether they have been breached demand a binary yes-or-no answer. “The
maximum speed-limit in this road is 70 mph.” This is a legal rule. It demands strict
compliance, and it either is or is not violated. Principles, in contrast, are more general
guidelines. They can be balanced against other principles and public interests and may

48 See Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651–52 (1980) (holding that the lower level of
reimbursement provided to Puerto Rico as compared to that provided to the states, under the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal
protection guarantee, and that the U.S. Congress “may treat Puerto Rico differently from States
so long as there is a rational basis for its actions.”); see also Califano v. Gautier Torres, 435
U.S. 1, 2–4 (1978) (reversing a district court decision holding that the denial of benefits under
the Supplementary Security Income provisions of the Social Security Act to a former resident
of Connecticut that moved to Puerto Rico violated his constitutional right to travel).
49 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2; see, e.g., Antilles Cement Corp. v. Fortuño, 670 F.3d 310,
323 (1st Cir. 2012) (arguing under the Supremacy Clause that the laws of Puerto Rico are
functionally equivalent to state laws, such that any Puerto Rico law “which interferes with or is
contrary to federal law, must yield”); P.R. Dep’t of Consumer Affs. v. Isla Petrol. Corp., 485
U.S. 495, 499 (1988) (holding that for preemption purposes, the laws of Puerto Rico are
equivalent to state laws); see also Club Gallístico de P.R. v. United States, 414 F. Supp. 3d 191,
204 (2019) (holding that “Congress has the undeniable authority to treat the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico uniformly to the States” and that “[t]he source of this authority rests primarily in
the Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause and alternatively in the Territorial Clause”);
Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 579 U.S. 115, 118 (2016) (holding that the Federal
Bankruptcy Code preempted the recently adopted Puerto Rican bankruptcy law).
50 Under Section 36 of the PRFRA, Puerto Rico has a non-voting “Resident Commissioner”
who sits in the U.S. House of Representatives. Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, Pub. L. No.
64–368, ch. 145, § 36, 39 Stat. 951, 963–64 (1917).
51 Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 25 (1967); RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 24 (1977).
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be realized in various degrees.52 “Careful driving” is a principle that, in contrast to the
previous rule, is more general, more abstract, and has semantic elasticity, meaning that
it may be realized to different rates. Implicit in the ten fundamental legal rules
identified above (and in the manner they have been applied throughout history) are
five principles that, are important components of the relationship between Puerto Rico
and the United States.
These principles are the following: (P1) the principle of autonomy; (P2) the
principle of subordination; (P3) the principle of consent; (P4) the principle of passive
U.S. citizenship; and (P5) the principle of progressive equalization. These principles,
like the previously discussed fundamental legal rules, are part of the basic structure of
territoriality but, unlike them, do not require a specific legal result. For example, while
R9 requires a court to invalidate any Puerto Rican law in conflict with applicable U.S.
legislation, P1 only demands that the actions of the U.S. Government move in the
direction of respecting the island’s autonomy. A decision running in the opposite
direction to one of these principles (as long as it is made in accordance with the
relevant legal procedures), would be perfectly valid. One may ask, then, what is the
importance, and legal significance, of these principles? Why are they part of the basic
structure of territoriality? Their main role, as we will see below, is to protect the
continuing legitimacy of the status quo.
1.

The Principle of Autonomy (P1)

The principle of autonomy means that there should be certain areas of social and
economic life which are to be regulated by norms adopted by Puerto Rican institutions.
In the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, Puerto Rico has been recognized to have a
“degree of autonomy and independence normally associated with States of the
Union[.]”53 The abolition of the Puerto Rican legislature through federal legislation,
for example, would amount to a radical rejection of this principle. The principle of
autonomy has been informing the relationship between the United States and Puerto
Rico since the very beginning, that is, since U.S. troops invaded the island in 1898.54
At that time, a military governor was vested by the U.S. President with the power to
legislate by decree.55 Two years later, the previously mentioned Foraker Act was
adopted, establishing a civil government in the island, which included an elected lower
legislative chamber.56 Seventeen years later the Jones Act was adopted, establishing
a fully elected bicameral legislature.57 In 1947, the Jones Act was amended in order

52 Robert Alexy, On the Structure of Legal Principles, 13 RATIO JURIS. 294, 295 (2000).
53 Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 594
(1976).
54 Major General John R. Brooke, General Orders Number 184, in ANNUAL REPORT OF
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN R. BROOKE, U.S. ARMY, COMMANDING THE DIVISION OF CUBA 1, 1–2
(1899).
55 Id. at 2.
56 Puerto Rico Civil Code, Pub. L. No. 56–191, ch. 191, § 27–28, 31 Stat. 77, 82 (1900).
57 Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 64–368, ch. 145, § 25–39, 39 Stat. 951,
958–65 (1917).
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to provide for the popular election of the Puerto Rican Governor.58 And in 1952,
through Public Law 600, the Puerto Rican legislature was authorized to call a
Constitutional Convention and draft a new constitution.59 The level of autonomy
achieved in 1952 was enough to convince a majority at the UN General Assembly to
vote in favor of the removal of the island from its list of Non-Self-Governing
territories.60
2.

The Principle of Subordination (P2)

The principle of autonomy, however, is in a constant tension with P2: the principle
of subordination. According to the principle of subordination, the decisions of Puerto
Rican institutions are ultimately subject to federal override.61 This principle (implicit
in R6 to R9) is reflected in the application of the Supremacy Clause of the Federal
Constitution to the island, in the resolution of the U.S. Congress approving the
Constitution of 1952, and in the limits that resolution placed on the potential content
of the island’s written constitution. The principle of subordination, by itself, would be
consistent with the repeal by the U.S. Congress of Public Law 600 and the replacement
of the Constitution of 1952 with a federal organic law. 62 But its interplay with the
principle of autonomy (and the principle of consent, discussed below), means that such
an action would be ultimately inconsistent with the basic structure of the relationship.
The principle of subordination does not only empower the U.S. government to act in
ways that contradict the decisions made by Puerto Rican institutions, but also requires
Puerto Rican institutions to respect the authority of the federal government. For
example, if the Puerto Rican legislature called a new Constituent Convention with the
purpose of re-inserting into the Constitution of 1952 the provisions that were not
accepted by the U.S. Congress, it would not have only acted ultra vires to the
constitution’s eternity clause but also contrary to the basic structure of territoriality.63
3.

The Principle of Consent (P3)

Before discussing P3 in any detail, we should make clear that we are not arguing
that the current territorial status is necessarily grounded on the consent of Puerto
Ricans. As we will see in Part IV, it is increasingly clear that it is not. Moreover, the
principle of consent is related to, but should not be confused with, another notion
which was highly influential during the 20th century and that is now known as the

58 Act of Aug. 5, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80–362, ch. 490, § 1, 61 Stat. 770, 770–71.
59 Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81–600, ch. 446, § 2, 64 Stat. 319, 319.
60 G.A. Res. 748 (VIII), at 200 (Nov. 27, 1953).
61 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
62 There is an old debate about whether the U.S. Congress would legally abrogate the
Constitution of 1952 (e.g. by simply repealing Public Law 600). As we will explain in Part V,
even though the U.S. Congress could certainly do that as a matter of U.S. constitutional law,
such an action would raise important questions about the place of constituent power in the
context of the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico.
63 This point in fact was raised at the Constituent Convention. See DIARIO, supra note 30, at
3130.
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“compact theory.”64 According to the compact theory, the relationship between Puerto
Rico and the United States is based on an agreement: the U.S. Congress offered to
authorize Puerto Rico to draft a new constitution (through the adoption of Public Law
600), and Puerto Ricans accepted that offer in a referendum. 65 As a result of that
agreement, it is said, Puerto Rico ceased to be a U.S. colony and acquired selfgoverning powers.66 This was the theory that U.S. and Puerto Rican officials
successfully presented at the U.N. General Assembly in 1953.67
There is a considerable amount of literature devoted to debunking the compact
theory by pointing to different times when the United States has intervened in the
island’s self-government.68 That debunking is probably unnecessary. At the time of
writing, as in 1900 and 1953, thousands of U.S. laws and regulations routinely apply
in the island, and that is more than enough to show that any attempt to present Puerto
Rico as a “self-governing” entity, compact or not, is simply a non-starter. Nonetheless,
the compact theory does describe an important aspect of the basic structure of
territoriality: many, if not the majority, of Puerto Ricans (e.g., status quo supporters
and many, if not most, of supporters of annexation as a state to the United States) do
not object to the operation of U.S. institutions in the island. 69

64 See, e.g., Jason Adolfo Otario, Puerto Rico Pandemonium: The Commonwealth
Constitution and the Compact-Colony Conundrum, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1806, 1848–53
(2004) (analyzing the compact theory between the people of Puerto Rico and the U.S.
government).
65 Id. at 1851.
66 Id. at 1851–52.
67 See JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD
121–24 (1997). When the United States government informed the U.N. Secretary General about
its decision to cease the transmission of information about Puerto Rico under Article 73 of the
U.N. Charter, it noted in the memorandum accompanying that communication:
By the various actions taken by the Congress and the people of Puerto Rico, Congress
has agreed that Puerto Rico shall have, under that Constitution, freedom from control
or interference by the Congress in respect of internal government and administration,
subject only to compliance with applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution, the
Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act and the acts of Congress authorizing and
approving the Constitution, as may be interpreted by judicial decision. Those laws
which directed or authorized interference with matters of local government by the
Federal Government have been repealed.
Comm. on the Info. from Non-Self-Governing Territories, Cessation of the Transmission of
Info.: Commc’n from the Gov’t of the United States of Am. Concerning Puerto Rico, Annex II
at ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. A/AC.35/L.121 (Apr. 3, 1953). Note that this statement, by itself, gives little
indication of the continuing routine application of ordinary federal statutes in the island.
68 See, e.g., The International Place of Puerto Rico, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1656, 1656, 1659
(2017); Gerardo J. Cruz, The Insular Cases and the Broken Promise of Equal Citizenship: A
Critique of U.S. Policy Toward Puerto Rico, 57 REV. DERECHO PUERTORRIQ. 27, 28–29 (2017);
Torruella, supra note 1, at 67, 85.
69 Issacharoff et al., supra note 6, at 2–3.
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This idea, which we call the principle of consent, at first sight, may appear
controversial. For example, recent attempts to condition the application of U.S. federal
statutes on a territory on the specific consent of the people of the latter have failed or
have been treated as non-binding.70 It is, however, the reason why some still insist in
the so-called compact theory: even if the United States has not always respected the
principle of autonomy, and has lately interfered in dramatic ways in the economic and
political life of the island, such interference is ultimately accepted (or at least tolerated)
by a great number of Puerto Ricans.71 Put differently, although compact theory should
not be taken seriously, consent has played a role in the legitimation of colonialism in
the island. Arguably, the willingness to consent to a relationship of subordination is,
at least to some extent, related to the role that U.S. institutions play in the provision of
social services in Puerto Rico and in responding to natural emergencies, even if the
amount of these federal contributions frequently falls short to those received by U.S.
states.72

70 Consider, for example, the Memorandum Opinion of the U.S. Office of Legal Counsel of
the Department of Justice on a bill (the Guam Commonwealth Act) that contained the following
provisions:
In order to respect the self-government granted to the Commonwealth of Guam under
this Act, the United States agrees to limit the exercise of its authority so that the
provisions of this Act may be modified only with the mutual consent of the
Government of the United States and the Government of the Commonwealth of Guam
. . . . Except as otherwise intended by this Act, no Federal laws, rules or regulations
passed after the date of this Act shall apply to the Commonwealth of Guam unless
mutually consented to by the United States and the Government of the
Commonwealth of Guam.
Guam Commonwealth Act, H.R. 100, 105th Cong. §§ 105, 202 (1997). The Memorandum
maintains that: “The power of [the U.S.] Congress to delegate governmental powers to nonstate areas thus is contingent on the retention by Congress of its power to revise, alter, and
revoke that legislation. Congress therefore cannot subject the amendment or repeal of such
legislation to the consent of the non-state area.” Mutual Consent Provisions in the Guam
Commonwealth Legislation, __ Op. O.L.C. Supp __, slip op. at 6 (July 28, 1994) available at
https://www.justice.gov/file/163646/download. A provision requiring mutual consent before
the amendment, or repeal on a “covenant” with a territory, was also included in the Covenant
to Established a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union With the
United States of America. Act of Mar. 24, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–241, § 105, 90 Stat. 263, 264.
In the previously mentioned Memorandum, it was suggested that such a provision is nonbinding, a view reaffirmed by a recent report of the U.S. Department of Justice. See Puerto Rico
Self-Determination Act of 2021, H.R. 2070, 117th Cong. (2021).
71 Issacharoff et al., supra note 6, at 2–3.
72 See, e.g., Charley E. Willison et al., Quantifying Inequities in U.S. Federal Response to
Hurricane Disaster in Texas and Florida Compared with Puerto Rico, BMJ GLOB. HEALTH
(Jan. 18, 2019), https://gh.bmj.com/content/4/1/e001191; Cheryl D. Block, Federal Policy for
Financially-Distressed Subnational Governments: The U.S. States and Puerto Rico, 53 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 218 (2017); Edwin Park, Addressing Puerto Rico’s Medicaid Funding
Shortfalls Would Help Ensure Fiscal Stability & Growth, CTR. ON BUDGET POL’Y & PRIORITIES
(SEPT. 19, 2016), https://www.cbpp.org/research/health/addressing-puerto-ricos-medicaidfunding-shortfalls-would-help-ensure-fiscal.
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Notwithstanding the above, from the perspective of P3, whether the territorial
relationship actually benefits the island is beside the point, as is the fact that the
territorial relationship began with a military invasion and has involved violence,
human rights violations, and political repression.73 What matters is that territoriality
is perceived as legitimate by a significant part of the population. 74 The principle of
consent, as seen in Part IV, has been recently undermined in important ways, to the
point that the relationship may be becoming unsustainable. Nonetheless, it is still a
key part of the basic structure of territoriality. Without it, the principle of
subordination, and the territorial relationship itself, would appear as a transparent form
of colonialism impossible to justify in the modern world. The principle of consent is
also an important part of the reason why the creation of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico in 1952 is seen by some contemporary observers as a democratically palatable,
even if sub-optimal, political status.75
4.

The Principle of Passive U.S. Citizenship (P4)

The distinction between passive and active citizenship was at one point pervasive
in the public law of most, if not all, jurisdictions, even if not always identified with
those terms. Passive citizens are those individuals who (at least in theory) possess
certain civil rights against the state (e.g. freedom of religion, freedom of association,
right to property), but lack full political rights (e.g. the right to vote and the right to
run for an elected office).76 Historically, passive citizens have included women,
foreigners, domestic servants, indigenous peoples, the illiterate, and those who did not
own enough property to be trusted with the well-being of the community.77 Active
citizens were those tax paying individuals considered the true members of the polity
and therefore capable of participating in its administration.78 Since the adoption of the

73 See, e.g., Emilio Pantojas-Garcia, The Puerto Rican Paradox: Colonialism Revisited, 40
LATIN AM. RES. REV. 163, 165 (2005); RAMÓN BOSQUE-PEREZ & JOSÉ JAVIER COLÓN-MORERA,
PUERTO RICO UNDER COLONIAL RULE: POLITICAL PERSECUTION AND THE QUEST FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS 2 (2006); René Francisco Poitevin, Political Surveillance, State Repression, and Class
Resistance: The Puerto Rican Experience, 27 SOC. JUST. 89, 89–90 (2000).
74 Issacharoff et al., supra note 6, at 2–3.
75 Id. at 23, 36. Issacharoff et al. goes as far as to describe the adoption of the Constitution of
1952 as a “constitutional moment” and refer to the island’s subordination as “subordination
entered into by virtue of an exercise of popular sovereignty.”
76 For a general discussion, see Bryan S. Turner, Outline of a Theory of Citizenship, 24 SOCIO.
189 (1990).
77 See RAFFAELE ROMANELLI, HOW DID THEY BECOME VOTERS: THE HISTORY OF THE
FRANCHISE IN MODERN EUROPEAN REPRESENTATION 21–25 (1998) for a historical discussion
focused on Europe.
78 See Rafe Blaufarb, The French Revolution: The Birth of European Popular Democracy?,
37 COMP. STUD. SOC. & HIS. 608, 611–12 (1995) for a discussion of the distinction between
active and passive citizenship in 18th century France.
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Jones Act in 1917, Puerto Ricans living on the island79 have enjoyed passive U.S.
citizenship (a fact reflected in the frequently used label “second class citizenship”):80
Their civil rights are guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution largely to the same degree81
as in U.S. states (and protected by U.S. federal courts), but they lack full political
rights in the federal government.82 The principle of passive citizenship mandates that
while able to exclude Puerto Ricans from formally participating in U.S. politics, any
systematic violation of their civil rights would be contrary to the basic structure of
territoriality.
5.

The Principle of Progressive Equalization (P5)

The principle of progressive equalization emerges not so much from any specific
legal document, but from the way the territorial relationship has developed since 1898.
The principle holds that any major differentiation between the U.S. states and Puerto
Rico to the detriment of the latter is to be avoided.83 The principle, to be sure, does
not require an absence of differentiation: the entire territorial relationship is based on
the inequality between the island and the United States. But such inequality has been
progressively reducing since 1898, to the extent that some scholars think that the island
has for a long time “functionally mimicked a state.”84 By 1952, Puerto Rico, like states
of the United States, could elect their own governor and their own legislative
assembly, and had an internal constitution that entrenched the same type of

79 Individuals born in Puerto Rico that later move to a U.S. state enjoy the full rights of
citizenship. 8 U.S.C. § 1402.
80 Nelson D. Hermilla, Puerto Rico 1898-1998: The Institutionalization of Second Class
Citizenship, 16 DICK. J. INT’L L. 275, 278 (1998) (arguing that “island inhabitants are second
class citizens that do not have a voting representative in the United States and cannot vote for
the President”); Emilio Pantojas-García, The Puerto Rican Paradox: Colonialism Revisited, 40
LATIN AM. RES. REV. 163, 170 (2015) (referring to “the paradox that lies behind the status of
Puerto Ricans as second-class citizens” as “grounded on the ethno-juridical and cultural
assumptions that framed American imperialism in 1898”); DIARIO, supra note 30, at 533–36,
1440.
81 Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309–12 (1922) (explaining the right to trial
by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution has been explicitly
determined not to apply in Puerto Rico). For a discussion, see Jasmine B. Gonzalez Rose, supra
note 33, at 511; Elizabeth Vicens, supra note 33, at 357; Juan R. Torruella, Ruling America's
Colonies: The Insular Cases, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 57, 77 (2013). See generally Andrew
Kent, The Jury and Empire: The Insupar Cases and the Anti-Jury Movement in the Gilded Age
and Progressive Era, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 375 (2018) (providing a general discussion to the right
to jury trials in U.S. territories); Charles F. Catterlin, Procedural Right to Jury Trial in an
Unincorporated Territory, 6 HASTINGS L.J. 197 (1955) (providing a general discussion on the
right to jury trials in U.S. territories).
82 See generally SAM ERMAN, ALMOST CITIZENS: PUERTO RICO, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND
EMPIRE (2019).
83 Territorial Federalism, supra note 7, at 1636.
84 Id. at 1654.
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government that is guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution to the States of the Union. 85
Puerto Rico is also subject, like U.S. states, to federal laws. There are of course some
exceptions in this tendency toward equalization. For example, Puerto Rico’s access to
U.S. welfare programs is not as extensive as that of the states, and this state of affairs
has been historically sanctioned by federal courts, even though there is currently a
potential movement in the opposite direction.86 The basic structure of territoriality
allows a degree of inequality but would be negated by a significant regression in the
movement towards equalization.87
The principles described above have not necessarily operated during the entire
history of the territorial relationship, and not all of them emerged as a result of the
constitution-making process that took place in the early 1950s. For example, the
principle of passive U.S. citizenship originated as a result of the adoption of the Jones
Act in 1917, the principle of subordination (and perhaps the principle of progressive
equalization) has arguably been operating in some form since the very signing of the
Treaty of Paris in 1898, and the principles of autonomy and consent, while pre-existing
Public Law 600, acquired a special importance after the adoption of the Constitution
of 1952.88
The previous discussion suggests that some of these principles pull in opposite
directions. Most dramatically, the principles of consent and autonomy stand in direct
tension with the principle of subordination. Subordination means that one will be
subject to norms regardless of one’s consent, and that one’s ability to self-rule (i.e., to
be autonomous), will always be at the mercy of someone else’s will. How is it possible
for these principles to be part of a same “basic structure?” At a more abstract level, it

85 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; Letter from The Acting Secretary of the Interior (Northrop) to the
Secretary of State (Oct. 9, 1952), in 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952-1954,
UNITED
NATIONS
AFFAIRS
1429
(Ralph
R.
Goodwin,
ed.
1979),
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v03/d902.
86 Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 662 (1980). See United States v. Vaello-Madero, 356 F.3d
12, 32 (1st Cir. 2019). Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court granted on March
1, 2021. The First Circuit Court of Appeals did not seek to abandon the notion that the U.S.
Congress can discriminate against Puerto Rico as long as there is a rational basis for its decision,
but rather that the exclusion of Puerto Ricans from the benefits of the Supplementary Security
Income provisions of the Social Security Act “is not rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381–1382(f).
87 At the same time, the principle of equalization can sometimes be problematic: treating
Puerto Rico as a state, in situations where it lacks full representation in the U.S. Congress, can
sometimes increase its subordinate status. An example of this is provided by the application in
Puerto Rico of the U.S. Federal Death Penalty Act, discussed in Part IV of this Article. In
Franklin, the U.S. Supreme Court recently determined that Puerto Rico was not a state for the
purposes of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, but it was a state for preemption purposes. Puerto Rico
v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 579 U.S. 115, 124–126 (2016). The consequence was that the
recently adopted Puerto Rican Recovery Act (passed with the purpose of dealing with the
island’s financial crisis) was invalid, and that Puerto Rican municipalities could not access the
federal bankruptcy process. Id. This case was decided a few days before PROMESA (discussed
in Part V of this Article) was adopted by the U.S. Congress. Id.
88 Letter from The Acting Secretary of the Interior (Northrop) to the Secretary of State, supra
note 85.
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is not unthinkable that the core identity or “basic structure” of a constitutional order
would include conflicting principles that are in tension. In fact, constitutional identity
is not static but emerges from the interplay of inevitably disharmonic elements. 89 As
we will see below, in the context of the relationship between Puerto Rico and the
United States, the tension between the principles of consent, autonomy, and
subordination is a result of the fact that, despite establishing and protecting the legal
superiority of the U.S. Congress over the island, the basic structure of territoriality
makes possible the co-existence of competing claims to sovereign authority.
III. BETWEEN POLITICAL AND LEGAL SOVEREIGNTY
A.

Two forms of Sovereignty?

The basic structure described above allows for the uneasy co-existence between
Puerto Rico’s claim to political sovereignty and the United States’ legal sovereignty
over the island. One of the most famous discussions of the distinction between political
and legal sovereignty occurs in A.V. Dicey’s Law of the Constitution. According to
Dicey, political sovereignty is held by “that body . . . in a state the will of which is
ultimately obeyed by the citizens of the state,” while legal sovereignty, in contrast, is
“a merely legal conception, and means simply the power of law-making unrestricted
by any legal limit.”90 In Dicey’s view, although the English Parliament could be said
to be politically controlled by the people (or the electorate), from a legal perspective
it is a different body—the King, Lords and the House of Commons acting together—
which possesses legal sovereignty.91 Put differently, the existence of a legally
sovereign legislature does not exclude the existence of a politically sovereign people.
In the context of the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States, U.S.
claims to legal sovereignty over the island are reflected in the basic structure of
territoriality itself: both the fundamental legal rules and the principles identified above
are premised on the idea that if there is an absolute legal power over Puerto Rico, that
power belongs to the U.S. Congress. This idea also finds expression in the Insular
Cases as well as in the recent jurisprudence of U.S. federal courts,92 but the prevailing
view in U.S. jurisprudence was well summarized by the U.S. District Court for Puerto
Rico in a 2016 decision:
[T]erritorial governments are entirely a creation of Congress. They owe all
their powers to the statutes of the United States conferring on them the
powers which they exercise, and which, as a Congressional delegation, are
liable to be withdrawn, modified or repealed at any time by Congress. What
is more, the right of Congress to revise, alter and revoke delegated powers
89 GARY J. JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 21–22 (J.K. Tulis and S. Macedo eds.,
2010).
90 A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 70–72 (8th
ed. 1915).
91 See MARK D. WALTERS, A.V. DICEY AND THE COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION:
A LEGAL TURN OF MIND 179–80 (2020).
92 See Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59, 76 (2016). See generally Franklin, 579
U.S. 115; Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. 1649
(2020).
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does not diminish the powers while they reside in the territory. Congress
retains plenary power over the territorial government until such time as the
territory is made independent. There is no indication that—even if it could—
Congress has surrendered any such power to Puerto Rico.93
It is difficult to negate that this is the status quo: from a legal perspective, the U.S.
is sovereign over its territories. Nonetheless, many Puerto Ricans (even if recognizing
U.S. legal sovereignty) would insist that the ultimate decision-making power over the
island lies in Puerto Rico. Even if, from the perspective of the U.S. legal system, that
view is demonstrably incorrect, this is not necessarily so from a political perspective.
The tension between these two conceptions is expressed in the very first provision of
the Constitution of 1952: “The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is hereby constituted.
Its political power emanates from the people and shall be exercised in accordance with
their will, within the terms of the compact agreed upon between the people of Puerto
Rico and the United States of America.”94 On the one hand, this provision suggests
that a new constitutional order was created (i.e., the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico)
in the exercise of a power held by the Puerto Rican people. Indeed, the process that
led to the adoption of the Constitution of 1952 has been recently described as “the
exercise of a constituent power among the affected population that expresses a will to
sovereignty.”95 On the other hand, the second part of the provision limits the exercise
of the political power of the resulting entity to the “terms of the compact” between the
island and the United States.
How does one understand the part of the provision that attributes the creation of
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to the Puerto Rican people? Does it really amount
to a claim of “political” sovereignty? An examination of the debates of the Constituent
Convention suggests that those questions should be answered in the affirmative. Many
of those who participated in the process that led to the creation of the Constitution of
1952 thought that they were acting on behalf of a sovereign people. 96 For example,
Antonio Fernós Isern argued that even in 1898, when Puerto Rico went through a
change of “sovereign” (from Spain to the United States), it did not “renounce neither
its natural right, nor the attributes of democratic sovereignty.” Puerto Rico’s “right to
liberty, as that of all peoples,” he maintained, is “immanent.” 97 In drafting a new
constitution, the Constituent Convention was affirming that reality. 98 In a similar vein,
Jorge Font Saldaña expressed that in accepting Public Law 600 and engaging in a
constitution-making process, “we are exercising our sovereignty to govern ourselves,”
and that through this process, Puerto Rico’s “inherent sovereignty” was being
recognized.99
93 United States v. Lebrón-Caceres, 157 F. Supp. 3d 80, 97 (D.P.R. 2016) (citations omitted).
94 P.R. CONST. art. I, § 1.
95 Issacharoff et al., supra note 6, at 38.
96 See, e.g., DIARIO, supra note 30, at 528.
97 Id. at 451–52.
98 Id. at 451.
99 Id. at 506–08.
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Fernós Isern and Font Saldaña were key members of the political party who
campaigned in favor of Public Law 600, but other less known supporters of that party,
such as Juan Bautista Soto, made similar expressions. 100 Soto referred to the
“inherent” and “immanent” sovereignty that accompanies an exercise of “constituent
power,” noting that, even though after 1952, Puerto Rico would only be able to
exercise a limited degree of political authority, it would do so in virtue of a constitution
founded on the island’s own sovereignty and not in an organic law adopted by the
United States.101 Perhaps more tellingly, even those delegates who saw Public Law
600 as simply reproducing the territorial relationship that had existed since the very
beginnings of the 20th century102 and as part of a “false propaganda” directed at
legitimizing colonialism, referred to the “sovereignty of our people to demand
representation in the U.S. Congress.”103 That was the case of Héctor González Blanes
and his colleague Ramiro Colón Castaño, who believed that, legally speaking, the
United States retained sovereign power over Puerto Rico but that the island possessed
a sovereign right to determine its future political status (which, in their view, should
be that of becoming a U.S. state).104
In a discussion about the content of the new constitution’s preamble, it was made
clear that these views should not be discarded as instances of empty political
rhetoric.105 The question was whether the preamble should refer to the establishment
of a “permanent union” with the United States.106 The amendment was rejected by the

100 Id. at 508, 2091.
101 Id. at 2092.
102 González Blanes described the 1950 process as follows:
Law 600 neither affects nor alters in any form the juridical-constitutional relations
between the United States Congress and the United States. In other words, the
jurisdiction [facultades] and congressional powers in relation to the territory of Puerto
Rico remain intact, as they actually exist . . . . [Public Law 600] simply grants this
island a greater internal autonomy, a higher degree of local self-government, in
exchange of the Puerto Rican people’s plebiscitary ratification of the present political,
social, and economic relations with the United States.
Id. at 1476–77.
103 Id. at 466.
104 Id. at 238.
105 See Liav Orgad, The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 714,
722–31 (2010) (presenting a typology of constitutional preambles and discussing their different
functions). See generally JUSTIN ORLANDO FROSINI, CONSTITUTIONAL PREAMBLES AT A
CROSSROADS BETWEEN POLITICS AND LAW (2012) (examining the extent to which constitutional
preambles are used as a tool of interpretation, of limiting constitutional amendments, and as a
parameter in judicial review); Wim Voermans & Maarten Stremler CONSTITUTIONAL
PREAMBLES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2017) (providing a quantitative and qualitative
analysis of constitutional preambles around the world).
106 In the end, the relevant part of the new constitution’s preamble read: “We, the people of
Puerto Rico, in order to organize ourselves politically on a fully democratic basis . . . do ordain
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majority of the delegates because it would suggest that the “door to independence
would be forever closed.”107 Given the boycott of the Constituent Convention by the
Puerto Rican Independence Party108 and the remaining sympathy for independence
among key members of the Popular Democratic Party, this was a thorny political issue.
A decision in favor of a “permanent” union with the United States was thus seen as an
abdication of what had been many times described at the Constituent Convention as
the natural right of the people of the island to govern itself; an alienation of their
political sovereignty.109 That continuing claim to political sovereignty was part of the
reason why Muñoz Marín could be seen as acting coherently (even if objectionably)
when defending the legitimacy of the continuing application of U.S. federal laws in
Puerto Rico110 and, at the same time, maintaining that such situation would continue
“until the moment our people decides it wants a different type of relationship and
freely expresses that desire”.111
When some of these same politicians participated in the public hearings about
Public Law 600 at the U.S. Congress, they made often quoted statements that, prima
facie, appeared to contradict the views discussed above.112 For example, Muñoz
Marín, seemingly accepting the legality of a future unilateral abrogation of Public Law
600 by the federal legislature, maintained that: “[O]f course, that if the people of
Puerto Rico should go crazy, Congress can always get around and legislate again.”113
Fernós Isern expressed that “H.R. 7674 would not change the status of the island of
Puerto Rico relative to the United States. It would not commit the United States for or

and establish this Constitution for the commonwealth which, in the exercise of our natural
rights, we now create within our union with the United States of America.” P.R. CONST. pmbl.
107 DIARIO, supra note 30, at 1394.
108 The Puerto Rican Independence Party was founded in 1946 and obtained 10% of the
popular vote in the 1948 general election. In 1952, it become the second political force in the
island, receiving 19% of the vote. Joel Colon-Rios & Martin Hevia, The Legal Status of Puerto
Rico and the Institutional Requirements of Republicanism, 17 TEX. HISP. J. L. & POL’Y 1 (2011);
Escrutinio de las Elecciones Generales del 2 de noviembre de 1948 Resultados para Candidatos
a Gobernador de Puerto Rico, EL ARCHIVO DE LAS ELECCIONES EN PUERTO RICO,
https://electionspuertorico.org/archivo/1948.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
109 See DIARIO, supra note 30, at 21, 451, for examples.
110 He argued that, unlike in U.S. states, where federal laws simply applied because they
were approved by a number of representatives, in Puerto Rico they would apply because the
people had determined it so in a referendum. Id. at 1469, 3086.
111 Id. at 1469. The same day in which it completed the draft constitution, the Constituent
Convention issued a resolution that reflected this idea, declaring that the people of Puerto Rico
“retain the right to propose and accept modifications in the terms of their relations with the
United States of America, so that, at all times, these are the expression of the agreement freely
concluded between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States.” Id. at 3007 (quotation
translated from original Spanish text).
112 See Puerto Rico Constitution: Hearings before the Comm. on Public Lands on H.R. 7674
and S. 3336, 81st Cong. 35 (1949–1950).
113 Id. at 33.
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against any specific future form of political formula for the people of Puerto Rico.”114
He added that the adoption of the bill “would not alter the powers of sovereignty
acquired by the United States over Puerto Rico under the terms of the Treaty of
Paris.”115 These statements were entirely consistent with U.S. Secretary of the
Interior’s report on the bill. According to that report, the adoption of Public Law 600
would not “in any way preclude a future determination by the Congress of Puerto
Rico’s ultimate political status,” that it “merely authorizes the people of Puerto Rico
to adopt their own constitution,” and that it “would not change Puerto Rico’s political,
social, and economic relationship to the United States.” 116 All those statements refer
to the reality that the United States possesses legal sovereignty over the island. That
reality, and this is the main point of this Part, can co-exist (albeit problematically) with
Puerto Rican claims to political sovereignty.
In fact, for some delegates, the view that Puerto Rico had some form of sovereignty
over the island was reflected in the very notion of a compact—if the United States
sought Puerto Ricans’ consent for the passing of Public Law 600, it must have been
because it recognized them as a sovereign people. Fernos Isern argued that under
Public Law 600, “the sovereignty of the people of Puerto Rico has been implicitly
recognized when its authority to convene is accepted; when, within the terms of the
covenant, its authority to adopt a constitution, to constitute themselves, to be
[themselves], is recognized.”117 That kind of approach found its way to a series of
cases decided by federal courts in 1953.118 For instance, in Mora v. Torres, the U.S.
District Court for Puerto Rico expressed that the island enjoyed “the total substance
of self-government . . . by consent”.119 In Mora v. Mejías, the same court (through a
different judge) stated that the island was “a political entity created by the act and with
the consent of the people of Puerto Rico” and that “it would seem to have become a
State within a common and accepted meaning of the word.” 120 Moreover, the court
stated that “under the terms of the compact,” Puerto Rico is “sovereign over matters

114 Id.
115 Id.
116 ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED
STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS 166 (1989).
117 DIARIO, supra note 30, at 508, 1627–28, 2090.
118 Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309, 313–14 (D.P.R. 1953). The decision was affirmed by
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, although judgment was reserved on
whether the Constitution of 1952 was an actual constitution or a new organic law. Mora v.
Mejías, 206 F.2d 377, 387 (1st Cir. 1953) (expressing that “[i]f the constitution of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is really a ‘constitution’ – as the Congress says it is . . . and not
just another Organic Act approved and enacted by the Congress, then the question is whether
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is to be deemed ‘sovereign over matters not ruled by the
Constitution’ of the United States and thus a ‘State’ . . .”).
119 Mora, 113 F. Supp. at 313–14.
120 Mejías, 206 F.2d at 387.
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not ruled by the Constitution of the United States.”121 That last statement confirms the
territorial character of the relationship, the fact that the United States is Puerto Rico’s
legal sovereign. But as exemplified in the Constituent Convention debates, some
would insist that that legal sovereignty was only made possible because, in the exercise
of what the delegates frequently referred to as the island’s “inherent sovereignty,”122
Puerto Ricans agreed to it.
To be sure, this does not make the so-called “compact theory” correct, but it is
ultimately based on an idea that is not only defensible politically but legally. To the
extent that the Puerto Rican people have a right to self-determination under
international law, they indeed have an “inherent sovereignty” to determine their future
political status.123 Further, to the extent the international right to self-determination is
part of U.S. law (e.g., in virtue of the U.S. ratification of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights in 1992),124 the potential exercise of that “inherent
sovereignty” is, at least in theory, recognized by the U.S. legal system.125 The idea

121 Id. at 612.
122 DIARIO, supra note 30, at 508, 1627–28, 2090.
123 For a discussion of Puerto Rico’s right to self-determination under international law, see,
e.g., Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Puerto Rico and the Right of Accession, 43 YALE J. INT’L
L. 229, 235 (2018) (arguing that “the values underlying self-determination suggest that Puerto
Ricans should have the ultimate say in whether to be more closely associated with the United
States.”).
124 Article 1 of the Covenant states: “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.” Article 3 states: “The States Parties to the present
Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing
and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall
respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, 3, Mar. 23, 1976,
999 U.N.T.S. 171. At the time of ratification, the U.S. Senate declared that Articles 1 to 27 “are
not self-executing.” About the effect of those reservations, see Torruella, supra note 1, at 100.
See generally 138 CONG. REC. 8068-71 (1992).
125 If such a situation were to actually take place, one would expect some politicians and
commentators (and possibly some courts), to maintain–in our view mistakenly–Uthat
international law only recognizes a remedial right to self-determination in cases of “colonial
dependence or alien subjugation, domination or exploitation”, and that those features are not
present in the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States. Peter Hilpold, Selfdetermination and Autonomy: Between Secession and Internal Self-Determination, in
AUTONOMY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: BETWEEN LEGAL ASSERTIONS AND UTOPIAN
ASPIRATIONS 39 (Peter Hilpold ed., 2018); see also Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998]
2 S.C.R. 217, 285, 295 (Can.) (holding that “[t]he right of colonial peoples to exercise their right
to self-determination by breaking away from the ‘imperial’ power is now undisputed . . . the
other clear case where a right to external self-determination accrues is where a people is subject
to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation outside a colonial context” and that “Quebec
does not meet the threshold of a colonial people or an oppressed people.”). Moreover, even if it
is accepted that Puerto Rico, as a colony, has the right to external self-determination, the
exercise of that right would certainly contradict both United States and Puerto Rican law (in the
latter case, it would be directly contrary to Article VII, Section 3 of the Constitution of 1952).
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that in the exercise of its right to self-determination, Puerto Rico may unilaterally
decide, at any moment, to become an independent nation where it is only subject to its
own laws, is currently taken as a given by most political actors (even by those strongly
opposed to independence).126 That very possibility, regardless of how unlikely it is
for it to materialize in the near future, is perhaps the most extreme manifestation of
the tension between political and legal sovereignty present at the bottom of the basic
structure of territoriality. In that sense, that structure, to use Hannah Arendt’s famous
phrase, “is built on quicksand.”127
B.

The Potential Instability of Territoriality

The tension between claims to political and legal sovereignty is brought to the
surface, and the basic structure of the relationship is thus put under strain, every time
the principles described in Part IV are negated. In this Part, this Article identifies a
series of events or decisions (originating in Puerto Rico or in the United States) which
have negated those principles. In engaging in this analysis, this Article stresses that
the negation of any of these principles is not necessarily problematic from a normative
perspective. In fact, the end of the colonial relationship requires the very abrogation
of the basic structure of territoriality. In order to understand that structure properly,
one nonetheless needs to consider what types of official actions are inconsistent with
it. Despite the examples given below, territoriality has proved extremely resilient, and
even actions that go beyond the negation of its principles and that directly affect the
operation of its fundamental legal rules have not resulted in a change in the territorial
relationship. Indeed, some of the events or decisions discussed below, in the long run,
may have had the effect of ensuring the long-term maintenance of the status quo.
1.

President Truman’s Veto

The 1940s were very active in terms of efforts, originating both in the United States
and Puerto Rico, to change the island’s political status. 128 After an initial failed

126 This is a widespread assumption that, since at the moment there is no majority support
for independence, is rarely made explicit. See Puerto Rico Democracy Act of 2009: Puerto Rico
Democracy Act of 2009: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources on H.R. 2499,
111th Cong. 34–38 (2009) (statement of Carlos Romero Barceló, Former Governor of Puerto
Rico) (suggesting that Puerto Rico could simply choose to become a separate sovereign). The
United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization has approved, 39 times (the latest one on
June 18, 2021), resolutions referring to the “Puerto Rican people[‘s] . . . inalienable right to selfdetermination and independence.” See Press Release, Special Comm. on Decolonization,
Special Committee on Decolonization Approves Text Calling upon United States to Promote
Puerto Rico’s Self-Determination, Eventual Independence, U.N. Press Release GA/3346 (June
18, 2021); Press Release, Special Comm. on Decolonization, Speakers Voice Concern about
Environmental, Fiscal Challenges of Puerto Rico as Special Decolonization Committee
Approves Annual Self-determination Text, U.N. Press Release GA/3337 (June 24, 2019).
127 HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 77, at 163 (2d ed. 1965).
128 This is not the place to give a full account of the context in which these efforts took place.
For a discussion, see Frank Otto Gatell, Independence Rejected: Puerto Rico and the Tydings
Bill of 1936, 38 HISP. AM. REV. 25, 25–26 (1958).
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attempt to provide for the popular election of the Governor by federal legislation, 129
and after two federal status bills that would have granted independence to the island130
were rejected by the U.S. Congress, Puerto Rico approved legislation to hold a local
referendum on its political status. In this referendum, electors would be given the
choice of voting for statehood, independence, or a “dominion” status and to trigger a
process that could end in a special election in the island about who should be appointed
by President Truman as the next Puerto Rican Governor.131 Rexford G. Tugwell, the
U.S. appointed Governor, vetoed both bills, arguing that they interfered with the
constitutional prerogative of the President and with Congress’s power to legislate on
the island’s relationship with the United States.132 A two-thirds majority of the
island’s legislature, exercising the powers conferred by Section 34 of the Jones Act,
overrode the Governor’s veto.133 In turn, Governor Tugwell referred the bill to
President Harry Truman, who exercised its ultimate veto power under the Jones
Act.134 In vetoing the bills, President Truman stated:
[The approval of the status referendum bill] might erroneously be construed
by the people of Puerto Rico as a commitment that the United States would
accept any plan that might be selected at the proposed plebiscite, and if the
plan thus selected should not be acceptable to the Congress, it could then be
argued that the United States was not keeping faith with the expressed will
of the people of Puerto Rico. In view of this possibility, and the harmful effect

129 77 CONG. REC. 6003 (1942) (Sen. Pagan introducing H.R.7352). See SURRENDRA BHANA,
THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUERTO RICAN STATUS QUESTION, 1936–
1968, at 57–72 (1975).
130 In 1945, a bill was presented by U.S. Senator Millard E. Tydings “to provide for the
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States over the island of Puerto Rico and for the
recognition of its independence” (making clear, in Section 6, that the military or naval bases
would not be transferred to the island’s government). S. 227, 79th Cong. (1st Sess. 1945). In its
preamble, the bill stated: “Whereas the people of Puerto Rico are entitled to full and complete
independence both as a matter of principle and broad American policy.” Puerto Rico Hearings
Before the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs United States Senate on S. 952, 78th
Cong. 2 (1943). Senator Tydings had previously presented two bills that would have granted
independence to the island, one in 1936 and the other one in 1943. The 1945 bill contained a
more favorable economic transition process for the island. For a discussion of these proposals,
see SURENDRA BHANA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUERTO RICAN
STATUS QUESTION 1936–1968, at 73–108 (1975).
131 S. 195 and S. 96 (both presented on February 21, 1946). For a discussion, see BHANA,
supra note 130, at 86.
132 BHANA, supra note 130, at 86.
133 Id.
134 This was only the second time in history a U.S. President exercised this power over Puerto
Rico’s legislature. The other time the veto power was exercised, also in 1946, was with respect
of a law adopted by the Puerto Rican legislature requiring the exclusive use of the Spanish
language in public schools teaching. S. 51, 16th Leg., 2d Sess. (P.R. 1946). See generally Pablo
Navarro-Rivera, The University of Puerto Rico: Colonialism and the Language of Teaching and
Learning, 1 J. PEDAGOGY, PLUR., AND PRAC. 32 (1999).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol70/iss2/7

28

2022]

A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF TERRITORIALITY

307

that such a misunderstanding would have on our relations with the people of
Puerto Rico, this measure ought not, in my opinion, to be allowed to become
law. The same principle is also applicable to the [bill providing or a poll of
qualified voters of Puerto Rico for the purpose of recommending one of their
citizens for appointment as Governor].135
Tugwell’s and Truman’s vetoes were, on the one hand, at odds with the principle
of progressive equalization (P5) and the principle of consent (P3). They put a stop to
a process that would have not only increased the degree of internal self-government
in the island,136 but provided an opportunity for Puerto Ricans to formally consent to
some form of relationship to the United States. 137 On the other hand, by unilaterally
approving a referendum on the island’s political future with the purpose of putting an
end to their colonial status, Puerto Ricans failed to abide by the principle of
subordination (P2). From the perspective of the fundamental legal rules governing the
relationship between Puerto Rico and the U.S., Governor Tugwell and President
Truman’s actions were entirely appropriate. However, from the perspective of P3 and
P5, they were highly problematic because the Puerto Rican legislature’s decision to
call a referendum on the island political status (despite its inconsistency with P2) was
a clear indication of a dissatisfaction with the relationship between Puerto Rico and
the United States which came close to a formal expression against its continuation in

135 Harry S. Truman, Statement by the President Upon Disapproving Bills of the Legislature
of
Puerto
Rico,
AM.
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT
(May
16,
1946),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-president-upon-disapproving-billsthe-legislature-puerto-rico.
136 This was exemplified in President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s message to Congress on
March 9, 1943, in the context of the discussion of the elective governor bill, where he stated:
“It has long been the policy of the Government of the United States progressively to reinforce
the machinery of self-government in its Territories and island possessions.” H.R. DOC. NO. 78126, at 1–2 (1943) (message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt).
137 In this context, Senator Tydings’ words during the discussion of the elective governor
bill are worth quoting:
Puerto Rico was won by the United States by conquest. Its people never agreed by
any sort of plebiscite to become a part of this country; and I should like to see the
Puerto Ricans given their freedom, the right to determine in full their own destiny,
subject always, of course, to the retention, with their consent, of military and naval
bases on the island of Puerto Rico, for their protection as well as ours, and to give
them such help as we could in order to make possible the transition from a state of
dependence to a state of independence, as we have done in the case of the Philippine
Islands. I should like to see the Puerto Ricans ask for that; I should like to see them
go the whole length rather than merely to ask to elect their own Governor. I believe
if such a course is taken, an end to the Puerto Rican problem will be reached, and until
such a course is taken we will face a perpetual and never-solved problem pending
continually before the Congress of the United States as well as with the Puerto Rican
people.
Amendment of Organic Law of Puerto Rico–Election of Governor: Hearing Before the Senate
Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, 78th Cong. 1686 (1943) (statement of Sen.
Tydings).
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its then current form.138 The vetoes were thus inconsistent with the basic structure of
territoriality, and brought to the surface the tension between political and legal
sovereignty. This did not go unnoticed by some U.S. officials. For example, Julius A.
Krug, Secretary of the Interior, thought that the veto of the referendum bill “would be
regarded by Puerto Rico, South America and the European nations…as a denial of
[the] oft-expressed principle [of self-determination].”139
2.

The U.S. Federal Death Penalty Act

The death penalty was abolished in Puerto Rico in 1929 and the Constitution of
1952 sought to protect that status quo from ordinary legislation.140 Section 7 of Article
II (Bill of Rights) thus reads: “[t]he death penalty shall not exist.” That status quo was
maintained until 1994, when the U.S. Congress passed the U.S. Federal Death Penalty
Act (FDPA).141 A few years later, two individuals convicted for acts that occurred in
Puerto Rico (punishable by death under the 1994 federal law), requested the U.S.
Court for the District of Puerto Rico to declare that the act providing for the federal
death penalty was locally inapplicable within the meaning of Section 9 of the PRFRA.
The court agreed, summing up its judgment in the following way:
(1) [T]he purpose of establishing [the] Commonwealth status in Puerto Rico
was to develop and enhance self-government by the people of Puerto Rico
and create an autonomous political entity; (2) in voting to accept Public Law
600 adopted by Congress as a compact with the people of Puerto Rico the
people of Puerto Rico accepted section 9 of the PRFRA, which provides for
the applicability to the Commonwealth of all Federal law if not locally
inapplicable; (3) the Commonwealth Constitution, which was adopted by the
Puerto Rican people and approved by Congress, expressly prohibits capital
punishment in Puerto Rico; (4) Puerto Rico's culture, traditions and values
are repugnant to the death penalty; and (5) the FDPA was not specifically
made extensive to Puerto Rico. Under these circumstances, the Court
concludes that the FDPA is locally inapplicable within the meaning of section
9 of the PRFRA.142
Had this decision been sustained in the U.S. Court of Appeals, Puerto Rico’s
formal consent to its subordination to the United States would have been given an
unprecedented juridical importance, or put differently, the balance between P2 and P3

138 After the resignation of Governor Tugwell in 1946, President Truman appointed for the
first time a Puerto Rican as the island’s governor and a few months later, the U.S. Congress
proceeded to amend the Jones Act in order to make the office of the Governor an elected one.
See BHANA, supra note 130, at 86.
139 Id. at 87.
140 The Death Penalty in Puerto Rico, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/the-death-penalty-in-puerto-rico (last visited Oct. 25,
2021).
141 Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–98.
142 United States v. Acosta Martínez, 106 F. Supp 2d 311, 321 (D.P.R. 2000) (emphasis
omitted).
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would have changed. That is to say, it would have meant that by ratifying Public Law
600 and adopting a constitution, Puerto Ricans had achieved, at least in some ways, a
level of autonomy higher than that of the states (where the federal death penalty act
would apply even if they had similar bans in their state constitutions). 143 But this is
not what happened. For the Court of Appeals, the approval of the Constitution of 1952
in no way changed “the applicability of United States laws and federal jurisdiction in
Puerto Rico,” and even while accepting the island’s “moral and cultural sentiment
against the death penalty,” its applicability in the island depended on “what Congress
intended.”144 Given that there was no indication to the contrary, the court concluded
that “[t]he death penalty is intended to apply to Puerto Rico federal criminal
defendants just as it applies to such defendants in the various states.” 145 In this sense,
the court (consistent with P5), treated Puerto Rico as a state, reaffirmed its
subordination to the United States, and discarded the notion that the 1952 “compact”
in any way limited U.S. legal sovereignty over the island.146
Note that the realization of P5 in this situation was nonetheless particularly
problematic. Puerto Rico’s lack of representation in the U.S. Congress, in accordance
with the principle of passive U.S. citizenship, meant that unlike a state, it was not able
to fully participate in the law-making process that led to the adoption of the FDPA.147
The decision of the Court of Appeals was not well received in Puerto Rico, with some
calling it “a betrayal of the island’s autonomy, culture and law, in particular its
Constitution.”148 That reception, however, was more a result of the strong anti-death

143 See Colin Miller, Sovereign Impunity: Why Double Jeopardy Should Apply in Puerto
Rico, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 174, 185–86 (2016) (arguing that a defendant’s claim
that the application of FDPA in New York violated the Tenth Amendment failed “not because
New York lacked the ability to make a Tenth Amendment objection; instead, the court noted
that ‘[n]o official of the State of New York has objected to assisting the federal government in
killing persons condemned to death in a federal criminal proceeding.’ . . . This is because states
and the federal government are dual sovereigns, meaning that the former can use the Tenth
Amendment to challenge Congressional attempts to compel state officials into administering
federal programs.”) (citing United States v. Taveras, No. 04-CR-156, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7408 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006)).
144 United States v. Acosta Martínez, 252 F.3d 13, 18, 19 (1st Cir. 2001).
145 Id. at 20.
146 This was not the first time the court reached that decision. See United States v. Quinones,
758 F.2d 40 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that a federal wiretapping statute applied in Puerto Rico
despite its prohibition by the Constitution of 1952.)
147 For a similar argument, see The International Place of Puerto Rico, supra note 68, at
1672.
148 Adam Liptak, Puerto Ricans Angry that U.S. Overrode Death Penalty Ban, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 2003, at A1. For further comments about the reception of the decision in Puerto Rico,
see The International Place of Puerto Rico, supra note 68, at 1671. The defendants in Acosta
Martínez were acquitted. To this date, no person has been sentenced to death by a Puerto Rican
jury. For a historical account of the application of the death penalty in the island, see JALIL
SUED-BADILLO, LA PENA DE MUERTE EN PUERTO RICO: RETROSPECTIVA HISTÓRICA PARA UNA
REFLEXIÓN CONTEMPORÁNEA (2000).
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penalty culture in Puerto Rico than of the legal significance of the court’s decision.149
The court, in the end, did not change in any way the basic structure of territoriality.
As noted earlier, the fundamental legal rules that comprise it provide for the
application of U.S. laws in Puerto Rico and for the subordination of the Constitution
of 1952 to federal legislation. The decision nonetheless put the territorial relationship
under strain because it brought to the surface something meant to remain hidden—the
tension between Puerto Rican claims to political sovereignty over the island and the
legal sovereignty of the U.S. over its territories.
3.

Vieques

During the Second World War, the U.S. Congress approved legislation to
expropriate most of Vieques’ land (an island-municipality located off Puerto Rico’s
eastern coast territory). As a result, between 21,000 and 26,000 of the island’s 33,000
acres were taken for military use by the U.S. Navy.150 This led to the relocation of
40% to 50% of the island’s inhabitants.151 At different times during the 1970s, the
popular movement against this military presence increased considerably, and even the
Puerto Rican government, through its Resident Commissioner, presented legislation
in the U.S. Congress to limit military exercises in Vieques.152 From the perspective
of the U.S. Navy, Vieques was presented as “absolutely critical to the readiness,
training, and preparation of our forces prior to their deployment overseas.” 153 In 1999,
when civilian David Sanes Rodríguez was killed by a 500 pound bomb dropped by an
F-18 aircraft that went off target,154 opposition to the U.S. Navy’s presence in Vieques
became a majoritarian cause in Puerto Rico.155 Massive protests followed,156 and a
civil disobedience movement that extended for several months developed.157
The response of the U.S. Navy to peaceful protests had historically involved
excessive use of force by federal marshals and the imposition of significantly high

149 Vicens, supra note 33, at 382–83.
150 Jacqueline N. Font-Guzmán & Yanira Alemán, Human Rights Violations in Puerto Rico:
Agency from the Margins, 12 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 107, 135–38 (2010).
151 Id. at 135.
152 Katherine T. McCaffrey, Social Struggle Against the U.S. Navy in Vieques, Puerto Rico:
Two Movements in History, 33 LATIN AM. PERSPS. 84, 89–93 (2006).
153 Font-Guzmán & Alemán, supra note 150, at 139; The Value of Vieques, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 15, 1999.
154 Font-Guzmán & Alemán, supra note 150, at 134.
155 Id. at 134–35.
156 On February 21, 2000, 150,000 protesters met in San Juan to demand the end of the
bombings. See McCaffrey, supra note 152, at 97.
157 See Carmen I. Aponte, U.S. Navy Versus Vieques, Puerto Rico: Social Justice Through
Civil Disobedience, 8 J. POVERTY 59, 70 (2004) (explaining that between February and May of
2000 more than 2,000 people participated in acts of civil disobedience).
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sentences by the federal court for non-violent offences such as trespassing.158 For
example, in the late 1970s, demonstrators against the U.S. Navy received sentences of
six months in federal prison under trespassing charges, and, after 1999, hundreds of
peaceful civil disobedients were arrested, and some imprisoned for unusually long
terms.159 By the early 2000s, it became clear that a great majority of Puerto Ricans
(informally and as represented by the governments of the day) demanded the end of
the U.S. Navy’s military activities in Vieques.160 Among the population of Vieques,
that rejection was formalized in a non-binding referendum organized in July 2001 by
the government of Puerto Rico as a response to a planned federal sponsored
referendum that never materialized.161 Sixty-eight percent of registered voters in
Vieques voted for the immediate cessation of bombings in the island. 162 Not long after
these results were announced, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill
cancelling the planned federal referendum and allowing the U.S. Navy to continue its
training until an “equal or better” training site was identified.163 The U.S. Navy ceased

158 Frances Olsen, Civil Disobedience on Vieques: How Nonviolence Defeated the U.S.
Military, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 547, 549–50 (2004); Aponte, supra note 157, at 68; Font-Guzmán
& Alemán, supra note 150, at 140–41.
159 Pedro Cabán, Bombs, Ballots, and Nationalism: Vieques and the Politics of Colonialism,
5 LATINO(A) RES. REV. 7, 24 (2002) (explaining that by August 2001, over 1,400 civil
disobedients had been arrested, and noting that the New York Times had referred to the
excessive sentences of the federal court in Puerto Rico). In 2002, the Special Committee on
Decolonization of the U.N. issued a resolution urging the United States to “halt the persecutions,
incarcerations, arrests and harassment of peaceful demonstrators; immediately release all
persons incarcerated in this connection; respect the fundamental human rights of health and
economic development; and decontaminate the impact areas” in Vieques. Press Release,
General Assembly, Decolonization Committee Urges United States to Halt Military Maneuvers
on Vieques Island, Return Occupied Land to People of Puerto Rico, U.N. Press Release
GA/COL/3065 (June 10, 2002).
160 Pedro Rosselló’s pro-statehood administration (1996-1999), as well as commonwealth
supporter Sila M. Calderón’s (2000-2003), both demanded at different points the cessation of
military exercises in Vieques. Elizabeth Becker, President Halts Target Practice by Navy on
Puerto Rican Island, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1999, at A1 (explaining that Governor Rosselló “told
Congress that the live firing training on the island had created an unacceptably high
unemployment rate for its residents, who have also had health problems, including a higher
cancer rate” and “that ‘bombs away, day after day’ had threatened the coral reef and wildlife of
the island”); Andrew Jacobs, Navy Bombing is Betrayal, Puerto Rico’s Governor Says, N.Y.
TIMES, April 29, 2001, at 24 (explaining that Sila M. Calderón led a successful political
campaign in Puerto Rico under the promise that she would end the bombings in Vieques).
161 Reuters, Referendum on Vieques is Delayed, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2001); Memorandum
on a Resolution Regarding Use of Range Facilities on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico, WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. (Jan. 31, 2000).
162 Majority in Vieques Vote U.S. Navy Out, CNN (July 29, 2001, 7:30 PM),
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/07/29/vieques.vote/.
163 Reuters, Puerto Rico High Court Orders Vote Preparations, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 18,
2001, at A9.
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its military activities in Vieques in 2003, as had been announced by President George
W. Bush a few years earlier.164
It is not difficult to see how these events put the relationship between Puerto Rico
and the United States under strain. On the one hand, the harsh treatment of Puerto
Rican protesters by U.S. institutions arguably ran contrary to the principle of passive
U.S. citizenship.165 On the other, the U.S. Navy’s insistence in continuing its military
activities in Vieques, and the continuing clashes between the Puerto Rican and U.S.
governments over the issue, tested the limits of the principle of consent. Had the U.S.
government not ordered the Navy to cease its activities in the island, the situation in
Vieques may have not only put the territorial relationship under strain (as it did), but
also result in a change in the basic structure of territoriality. In the end, however, that
change did not take place, even though the principle of consent was seriously tested
by the initial refusal of U.S. authorities to stop its military activities in Vieques. That
result was achieved at a high price (e.g., the subjection of thousands of Puerto Ricans
to arrests and potential incarceration in federal prisons) but, perhaps ironically, it may
have contributed to the reproduction of the basic structure of territoriality.166
Although, legally, the U.S. had the sovereign authority to maintain its military
activities in Vieques, it was unable to do so in light of the clear political will of Puerto
Ricans.
4.

The 2012 Status Referendum

Since 1967, there have been six non-binding referendums on the island’s political
status.167 All of them were triggered by the Puerto Rican Legislature, although there
also were several failed attempts to pass status legislation in the U.S. Congress.168 The
2012 referendum, unlike the other five, which asked electors to choose among
different status alternatives, included two questions. 169 The first one asked the
electors: “Do you agree that Puerto Rico should continue to have its present form of

164 Bush Says Navy Will Quit Bombing Vieques, CNN (June 14, 2001, 9:54 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2001/US/06/14/vieques.halt.04/ (quoting Bush expressing that: “There's
been some harm done to people in the past. These are our friends and neighbors, and they don't
want us there.”). See Olsen, supra note 158, at 558–59. The ceasing of military activities in
Vieques was not accompanied by a full clean-up and devolution of the expropriated lands. For
a discussion, see Sherrie L. Baver, ‘Peace is More than the End of Bombing’: The Second Stage
of the Vieques Struggle, 33 LATIN AM. PERSPS. 102 (2006).
165 See supra Part II(b)(iv).
166 Aponte, supra note 157, at 68, 70.
167 Joel Colón-Ríos, Scholars and the Politics of Puerto Rico’s Constitutional Status, IACLAIDC BLOG (May 6, 2021), https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2021-posts/2021/05/06-puerto-ricosconstitutional-status.
168 Id.; For a discussion of different attempts to pass status legislation at the U.S. Congress,
see Manuel Rodriquez Orellana, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Congress: The Road Ahead, 21 TEX.
HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 31 (2015).
169 Colón-Ríos, supra note 167, tbl. 1.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol70/iss2/7

34

2022]

A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF TERRITORIALITY

313

territorial status?”170 The second asked them to choose between three “non-territorial”
alternatives: statehood, independence, or free association (or a ‘sovereign free
associated state’).171 In the first question, 53.97% of the electors (on a 79% turnout)
voted “no.”172 In the second question, statehood obtained a vote of 61.16%,
independence obtained 5.49%, and free association obtained 33.34%.173 The result of
the second question was interesting. This was the first time statehood was supported
by the majority of the electorate, and also that a relatively large number of voters
(almost 40%) expressed their support for the island becoming a sovereign country,
either as an independent nation or in free association with the United States. However,
the result of the first question was the most significant one: a majority of the electorate
rejected (i.e., formally withdrew its consent) to the current territorial status.
By deciding to ask that question, the Puerto Rican legislature, perhaps more than
in 1946, directly challenged the principle of subordination and tested the limits of the
principle of consent. This formal withdrawal of consent to the colonial status quo did
not have any immediate effects on the relationship. Based on these results, in 2017, a
new referendum was organized by the island’s government.174 Initially, the
referendum would have fully excluded the territorial status as an option on the basis
that it had been rejected by the electors in 2012.175 It would have rather asked electors
to choose between statehood and an independence/free association alternative.176 If
the latter option prevailed, a second referendum would take place where electors
would decide between free association and independence.177 A few months before the
vote, the U.S. Department of Justice informed the Puerto Rican government that the
use of federal funds in the referendum would be conditioned to the inclusion of the
current territorial relationship as an alternative.178 In response, the island’s
government amended the referendum law to include the status quo as an option,179 an
action that resulted in an electoral boycott and in an historically low (23%) turnout.180

170 Official Ballot Sample, STATE ELECTIONS COMM’N (Nov. 6, 2012),
https://ww2.ceepur.org/sites/ComisionEE/es-pr/Documents/PapeletaModeloPlebiscito12.pdf.
171 Id.
172 Colón-Ríos, supra note 167.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.; Puerto Rico Immediate Decolonization Act, 2017 P.R. Laws 7.
176 Colón-Ríos, supra note 167.
177 Id.
178 Letter from Dana J. Beonte, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., to Ricardo A. Rosselló, Governor
of P.R. (April 13, 2017), https://www.puertoricoreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/HonRicardo-Rossello-Nevares-Letter-DOJ-Apr-13-2.pdf.
179 2017 P.R. Laws 24.
180 Plebiscite for the Immediate Decolonization of Puerto Rico, Status Consultation Island
Results,
(Jul.
25,
2017,
5:06
PM),
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Although put under strain by the results of the 2012 referendum, the basic structure of
territoriality once more emerged largely unscathed.
5.

Sánchez Valle

From the perspective of the basic structure of territoriality, Sanchez v. Valle181 is
largely irrelevant for what it actually decided. Whether the U.S. federal government
and Puerto Rico are separate sovereigns for purposes of the Double Jeopardy clause
of the U.S. Constitution has little to do with the fundamental legal rules and principles
that comprise that structure. Put differently, the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Sánchez v. Valle (in a 6-2 judgment) did not alter, or threaten to alter, the island’s
colonial status.182 From the perspective of the basic structure of territoriality, the case
is nonetheless important, not for what it decided, but for what it says. The decision
contains language consistent with P1 (“[T]he United States and Puerto Rico have
forged a unique political relationship, built on the island’s evolution into a
constitutional democracy exercising local self-rule.”)183 and P5 (“Over time,
Congress granted Puerto Rico additional autonomy.”)184 It also includes references to
the role of consent (P3) in the relationship.185 Nonetheless, it contains expressions
that directly challenge the notion that even though the United States currently holds
legal sovereignty over the island, Puerto Rico’s relationship with the United States is

http://resultados2017.ceepur.org/Escrutinio_General_79/index.html#es/default/CONSULTA_
DE_ESTATUS_Resumen.xml; Patricia Guadalupe, Amid Historically Low Voter Turnout,
Puerto Ricans Vote for Statehood, NBC NEWS, (June 11, 2017, 6:00 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/amid-historically-low-turnout-puerto-ricans-votestatehood-n770801.
181 Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59, 78 (2016).
182 Comments by some commentators, like the one following, are surprising given that
Puerto Rico was not self-governing even before Sanchez v. Valle:
And sovereignty matters. Sovereignty, after all, ‘means freedom, the freedom of a
people to choose what their future will be’ — including what laws will govern them
and their fellow citizens. It is understandable, then, that many Puerto Ricans would
come to view Sanchez Valle — when joined with the Court’s opinion in Puerto Rico
v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust and the enactment of the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), all products of
June 2016—as one prong of an unholy trinity signifying nothing short of a resurgence
of a colonial condition long believed to have been discarded from their shores. In one
commentator’s words, ‘Puerto Rico has been stripped naked and put on show to be
shamed.’ Sanchez Valle makes clear that Puerto Ricans are not free in the sovereign
sense: they live under Congress’s shadow, in the end subject to its will. Justice
Kagan’s talk of the Commonwealth’s special relationship with the United States does
nothing to lessen the sting.
Fifth Amendment: Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 130 HARV. L. REV. 347, 355–56 (2016).
183 Sánchez Valle, 579 U.S. at 63.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 64–65, 73, 76.
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ultimately based on the agreement of Puerto Ricans in the exercise of their “inherent”
or political sovereignty. In so doing, the Court brought to the surface the tension
underlying the basic structure of territoriality.
The basis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision is that the test to determine whether
the doctrine of dual sovereignty makes the Double Jeopardy clause applicable is not
“the degree to which an entity exercises self-governance,” which is usually connected
to whether an entity is seen as “sovereign,”186 but rather, the test takes the form of a
historical inquiry that seeks to identify “the deepest wellsprings . . . of prosecutorial
authority.”187 The Court explained that U.S. states, regardless of when they joined the
federation, are deemed to possess “separate and independent sources of power and
authority,” so that state prosecutions have “their most ancient roots in an ‘inherent
sovereignty;’ unconnected to, and indeed pre-existing, the U.S. Congress.”188 The
same applied to Native American tribes, who were originally described as “selfgoverning sovereign political communities” holding an “inherent power to prescribe
laws for their members and to punish infractions of those laws.” 189 It may be true, the
Court argued, that Puerto Rico is “‘sovereign’ in one commonly understood sense of
that term,” since in 1952 Congress “relinquished its control” over the island’s “local
affairs, granting Puerto Rico a measure of autonomy comparable to that possessed by
the States.”190 However, those attributes of self-government derived from the U.S.
Congress and not from an original Puerto Rican sovereignty:
[C]ontrary to petitioner’s claim, Puerto Rico’s transformative constitutional
moment does not lead to a different conclusion. True enough, that the
Commonwealth’s power to enact and enforce criminal law now proceeds,
just as petitioner says, from the Puerto Rico Constitution as “ordain[ed] and
establish[ed]” by “the people.” . . . But that makes the Puerto Rican populace
only the most immediate source of such authority—and that is not what our
dual-sovereignty decisions make relevant. Back of the Puerto Rican people
and their Constitution, the “ultimate” source of prosecutorial power remains
the U.S. Congress, just as back of a city's charter lies a state government. . . .
Congress, in Public Law 600, authorized Puerto Rico’s constitution-making
process in the first instance; the people of a territory could not legally have
initiated that process on their own. . . . And Congress, in later legislation,
both amended the draft charter and gave it the indispensable stamp of
approval; popular ratification, however meaningful, could not have turned
the convention’s handiwork into law. Put simply, Congress conferred the

186 Id. at 67 (“Truth be told, however, ‘sovereignty’ in this context does not bear its ordinary
meaning. For whatever reason, the test we have devised to decide whether two governments are
distinct for double jeopardy purposes overtly disregards common indicia of sovereignty.”).
187 Id. at 68.
188 Id. at 69. As noted in Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 573 (1911): “[W]hen a new State is
admitted into the Union, it is so admitted with all the powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction
which pertain to the original States.”
189 Sánchez Valle, 579 U.S. at 70.
190 Id. at 74.
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authority to create the Puerto Rico Constitution, which in turn confers the
authority to bring criminal charges. That makes Congress the original source
of power for Puerto Rico’s prosecutors—as it is for the Federal
Government’s. The island’s Constitution, significant though it is, does not
break the chain. . . . But one power Congress does not have, just in the nature
of things: It has no capacity, no magic wand or airbrush, to erase or otherwise
rewrite its own foundational role in conferring political authority. Or
otherwise said, the delegator cannot make itself any less so—no matter how
much authority it opts to hand over. . . . Puerto Rico boasts a relationship to
the United States that has no parallel in our history. And since the events of
the early 1950s, an integral aspect of that association has been the
Commonwealth’s wide-ranging self-rule, exercised under its own
Constitution. As a result of that charter, Puerto Rico today can avail itself of
a wide variety of futures.191
Puerto Rico, in other words, lacked the “inherent sovereignty” possessed by states
and tribes in the United States. This view, as we saw in Part IV of this Article, negates
the idea reflected by many delegates at the Constituent Convention: the new
constitution was, at least partly, based on the exercise of Puerto Rican’s ultimate
sovereignty over the island. At the same time, the Court made sure to expressly
recognize the elements of “self-rule” present in the island, and to the island’s ability
to determine its “future” (whether the Court was referring there to its future political
status is not clear).192 Not surprisingly, for some in Puerto Rico, the decision
reaffirmed a colonial relationship that needs to be left behind; for others, it highlighted
the island’s self-government powers.193 In that respect, and despite its explicit
negation of the island’s inherent sovereignty, the decision may have reproduced the
relationship’s basic structure, once again allowing seemingly inconsistent claims to
co-exist.194 Nonetheless, by explicitly embracing the view that the island’s
constitutional order ultimately rests on the sovereignty of Congress, and not on a

191 Id. at 75–76 (internal citations omitted).
192 Id.
193 See José A. Hernández Mayoral, El Autonomismo Luego de Sánchez Valle, EL NUEVO
DÍA
(June
13,
2016),
https://www.pressreader.com/puerto-rico/el-nuevodia1/20160613/281964606997170 (arguing that, although determining that Puerto Rico never
had an “inherent sovereignty,” the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the island’s autonomy); see
also Carlos E. Díaz Olivo & Edwin J. Vélez Borrero, Promesa Incumplica, Sánchez Valle,
Franklin Trust: El Rol de la Rama Judicial Federal en la Relación entre Puerto Rico y los
Estados Unidos, 86 REV. JURÍDICA UPR 1, 37 (2017) (arguing that Sánchez Valle showed that
“we are still marked by the problem [carimbo] of territoriality or, less euphemistically, by the
disgrace of colonialism.”).
194 One has to remember that the U.S. Supreme Court did nothing but to affirm a decision of
the island’s Supreme Court, which like its U.S. counterpart, held that “Puerto Rico never had
an original or previous sovereignty through which it delegated powers to Congress. It was the
other way around.” Pueblo v. Sánchez Valle, 192 D.P.R 594, 644 (2015). In deciding in this
way, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico overruled its decision in Pueblo v. Castro García, 120
P.R. Offic. Trans. 740, 819 (1988), where it held the island’s government was a ‘sovereign’ for
the purposes of the dual sovereignty doctrine.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol70/iss2/7

38

2022]

A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF TERRITORIALITY

317

decision of the Puerto Rican people to agree to its own subordination, the U.S.
Supreme Court highlighted the relationship’s underlying tension.
6.

PROMESA

In 2016, the same day the Sánchez Valle’s decision was released, and as a means
to deal with the island’s public debt crisis, the U.S. Congress adopted the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA).195 PROMESA
created the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (“the board”),
a body with extensive powers over the island’s government. The board is described
“as an entity within the territorial government” and not as a federal organ. 196 It
consists of seven members appointed by the U.S. President,197 plus the Governor as
an ex-officio member without voting rights.198 It can require the Governor to submit
“budgets and monthly or quarterly reports regarding a covered territorial
instrumentality” and approve the island’s “Fiscal Plan.” 199 The Fiscal Plan has the
main objective of providing “a method to achieve fiscal responsibility and access to
the capital markets,” and it must determine if the budget “proposed” by the
government is “compliant” with the relevant fiscal priorities. 200 Importantly, “if the
Governor and the Legislature fail to develop and approve a Territory Budget that is a
compliant budget,” the board can prepare the budget itself, which is then “deemed to
be approved by the Governor and the Legislature.” 201
At the same time, PROMESA requires the Governor to submit to the board any
law that “the territorial government duly enacts,” and if the board determines that it is
“significantly inconsistent” with the Fiscal Plan, it “shall direct the territorial
government to (i) correct the law or eliminate the inconsistency or (ii) provide an

195 Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 21012241. In regard to the adoption of a law like PROMESA (which, as we will argue below,
implicitly repeals part of the Constitution of 1952), Fernós Isern stated at the congressional
hearing on Public Law 600 to the effect that “the authority of the Government of the United
States, the Congress, to legislate in case of emergency would always be there.” Puerto Rico
Constitution: Hearings on H.R. 7674 and S. 3336 Before the H. Comm. On Pub. Lands, 81st
Cong. 33 (1950). Similarly, in an English 1965 case dealing with colonial Gambia, Lord
Denning maintained that “[t]he implied renunciation by the Crown [of its constituent power
once it grants a colony a constitution] only applies while the legislative institutions are in
existence and capable of functioning,” and when these colonial institutions are incapable of
doing so, the Crown can “resort to its prerogative power to amend the constitution or set up a
new one.” Sabally and N’Jie v. H.M. Attorney-General (1965) 1 QB 273 at 293.
196 48 U.S.C. § 2121(101)(c)(1).
197 The constitutionality of these appointments under Article II, Section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution was upheld in Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S.
Ct. 1649 (2020).
198 48 U.S.C. § 2121(101)(e)(3).
199 Id. § 2121(101)(d)(1)(B), (h)(2).
200 Id. § 2141(201)(b)(1).
201 Id. § 2142(202).
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explanation for the inconsistency that the Oversight Board finds reasonable and
appropriate.”202 If the government of Puerto Rico fails to comply with a direction
given by the board with respect to a law, the board “may take such actions as it
considers necessary . . . including preventing the enforcement or application of the
law.”203 According to Section 209 of PROMESA, the board would cease to operate
once it certifies that Puerto Rico has gained access to credit markets at reasonable
interest rates, and that for “at least 4 consecutive fiscal years” it has a balanced
budget.204 There is no doubt that PROMESA limits the force of the Constitution of
1952. It changes the ways in which political power is exercised in Puerto Rico and
implicitly repeals the provisions of the island’s constitution regulating its law-making
process.205 For example, prior to PROMESA, the adoption of legislation regulating
the retirement eligibility of the island’s government employees was, according to
Article III (The Legislative Power) of the Constitution of 1952, under the sole
jurisdiction of the Puerto Rican legislature.206 Now, it is not. At the time of writing,
the board had just notified the Puerto Rican Senate that a bill extending retirement
eligibility to most government employees was “significantly inconsistent” with the
approved Fiscal Plan and that its implementation would violate PROMESA. 207
It is not difficult to see that PROMESA is directly inconsistent with P1 and P3
because it reduces the island’s degree of internal self-government without the formal
consent of Puerto Ricans, and at a moment where, after the 2012 referendum, their
consent to the current relationship can no longer be taken for granted. At the same
time, PROMESA is inconsistent with P5. In adopting it, the U.S. Congress did

202 Id. § 2144(204)(a)(4)(B).
203 Id. § 2144(204)(a)(5).
204 Id. § 2149(209).
205 Unlike express repeal, “implied repeal” does not require the formal repeal of the relevant
legal rule, but rather the adoption of an inconsistent provision of the same hierarchy (or of a
higher hierarchy). For instance, when a newly adopted ordinary law conflicts with a previous
ordinary law without expressly repealing it, we say the older law has been impliedly repealed
(to the extent of the conflict) even though it will remain in the books and will become valid and
enforceable again if the most recent conflicting legislation is itself repealed. The same does not
happen with express repeal: The abrogation of the repealing legislation does not bring back to
life the previously expressly repealed one. See 36 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 1, 468
(Viscount Simonds ed., 3d ed. 1961) (“To the extent that the continued application of a general
enactment to a particular case is inconsistent with special provision subsequently made as
respects that case, the general enactment is overridden by the particular, the effect of the latter
being to exempt the case in question from the operation of the general enactment or, in other
words, to repeal the general enactment in relation to that case.”).
206 P.R. CONST. art. III, § 16; 48 U.S.C. §§2102-2241.
207 Letter from Natalie Jaresko, Exec. Dir. of Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., to Hon.
Juan
Zaragoza,
Member
of
P.R.
Senate
(July
2,
2021),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ecVXSDeUBUsMXE7amtJj2bYCc9Ri366j/view.
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something to Puerto Rico that would be unconstitutional if done to a U.S. State. 208 In
a way, the adoption of PROMESA did not only negate several principles that are part
of the basic structure of territoriality, but it may have actually changed some of its
fundamental legal rules. This is arguably the case of R1 (Puerto Rico has the right to
organize a government pursuant to their own constitution). PROMESA, as explained
above, overrode, at least temporarily, key parts of that constitution. No action
originating in the United States or Puerto Rican governments have put the territorial
relationship under more strain than the adoption of PROMESA in 2016.
7.

The 2021 Report of the U.S. Department of Justice

The final event that we briefly examine in this Part is, by itself, relatively minor
and could have even gone unnoticed. We nonetheless mention it because, not only did

208 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (noting that “[w]hile Congress
has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including areas of intimate concern to the
States, the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require
the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”); see also Territorial Federalism,
supra note 7 at 1641 (arguing that “[w]hat Congress has done to Puerto Rico with PROMESA
– and may do to other U.S. territories in the future – courts undoubtedly would not sanction if
done to a sovereign state.”). Moreover, PROMESA, if applied to a state, would arguably violate
the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which requires the United States to “guarantee
to every State in this Union a republican form of government.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
Although the Guarantee Clause has sometimes been treated as non-justiciable (Luther v.
Burden, 48 U.S. 1, 46–47 (1841)), the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that “not all claims
under the Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable political questions.” New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. at 185; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 542 (1964). In her concurring
opinion in Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1675,
1677–79 (2020), Justice Sotomayor came very close to suggesting that in requiring Puerto Rico
to adopt a constitution establishing a republican form of government (understood as “the right
of the people to choose their own officers for government administration and pass their own
laws in virtue of the legislative power reposed in representative bodies, whose legitimate acts
may be said to be those of the people themselves,”) Congress may have become unable to
validly apply a law like PROMESA to Puerto Rico. 48 U.S.C. § 731(2) (stating that Puerto
Rico's "constitution shall provide a republican form of government and shall include a bill of
rights."). In Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 279 (1901), the U.S. Supreme Court noted that
the U.S. Congress may establish a non-republican form of government in territories that it
determines are not ready for it (which may have been Congress’s view about Puerto Rico in
1901, but not after 1950). See Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 38 (D.D.C. 2000) (rejecting
an injunction request directing the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and
Management Assistance Authority to “take no further action” and “disband itself” and
expressing that the Guarantee Clause did not apply to the District of Columbia). Note, however,
that in its recent report on the Puerto Rico Statehood Admission Act, the U.S. Department of
Justice “recommends that Congress expressly provide in H.R. 1522, or in separate legislation
enacted during the transition period effected by the President’s proclamation of a date for
admission of Puerto Rico, for an orderly transition of the Oversight Board into an entity of the
new State of Puerto Rico. Alternatively, of course, Congress may decide that the Oversight
Board should terminate operations if Puerto Rico becomes a state, in which case the Department
would also recommend express legislation to that effect.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., H.R. 1522, THE
PUERTO RICO STATEHOOD ADMISSION ACT 7 (2021), https://aldia.microjuris.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/06/DOJ-Analysis-of-HR-1522.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE STATEHOOD ADMISSION ACT].
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it not go unnoticed in Puerto Rico,209 but it provides a key insight into the way in
which the U.S. Government currently understands its relationship with the island. In
June 2021, the U.S. Department of Justice made public its analysis of two status bills
that (at the time of writing) are under consideration by the U.S. Congress.210 One of
those bills is the Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act, 211 which would put in place
a process that involves the calling of a “Status Convention” in the island. 212 The
elected delegates to the Status Convention would determine the selfdetermination options to be included in a referendum. 213 The self-determination
option favored by the majority would then be presented to Congress. 214 In the
provision defining the Status Convention, the bill states: “The legislature of
Puerto Rico has the inherent authority to call a status convention through an Act
or Concurrent Resolution. . . .”215 The U.S. Department of Justice expressed
concern with the inclusion of this language. It noted the following:
The Department’s first comment relates to the reference to the Puerto Rico
legislature’s having “inherent” authority to call a status convention. H.R.
2070, § 3(a). We surmise that this description of the nature of Puerto Rico’s
authority is intended to acknowledge the Commonwealth’s significant
autonomy and powers of self-government. We note, however, that the use of
the word “inherent” may create confusion as to the ultimate source of the
Puerto Rico government’s authority. As the Supreme Court recently noted,
even though “Puerto Rico today has a distinctive, indeed exceptional, status
as a self-governing Commonwealth,” the “ultimate source” of Puerto Rico
law is an enactment of the U.S. Congress. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136
S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2016) . . . . Describing Puerto Rico’s authority as
“inherent”—that is, “existing. . . as a permanent attribute or quality . . .
indwelling, intrinsic,” OED Online (Mar. 2021)—when in fact that authority
derives from Congress, is legally inaccurate. The Department does not object
to some sort of acknowledgment of Puerto Rico’s self-governance, but to

209 Departamento de Justicia Recomienda Cambios a los Proyectos sobre el Status Político
de
Puerto
Rico,
EL
NUEVO
DÍA
(June
15,
2021),
https://www.elnuevodia.com/corresponsalias/washington-dc/notas/departamento-de-justiciafederal-recomienda-cambios-a-los-proyectos-sobre-el-status-politico-de-puerto-rico/.
210 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., H.R. 2070, THE PUERTO RICAN SELF DETERMINATION ACT OF 2021
(2021),
https://aldia.microjuris.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/DOJ-Analysis-of-HR2070.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SELF DETERMINATION ACT]; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE STATEHOOD ADMISSION ACT, supra note 208.
211 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE STATEHOOD ADMISSION ACT, supra note 208; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SELF DETERMINATION ACT, supra note 210.
212 H.R. 2070, 117th Cong. § 3(a) (2021).
213 Id. § 3(d).
214 Id. § 4.
215 Id. § 3(a) (emphasis added).
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avoid confusion as to the source of the Puerto Rico legislature’s authority,
we recommend striking the word “inherent.”216
As in 2017, the Department of Justice also noted that the current territor ial
status needed to be included as one of the self-determination options, a view that
contrasted to Section 3(c)(1) of the bill, which establishes that the Status
Convention would develop options for Puerto Rico that are “outside the
Territorial Clause of the United States Constitution.” 217 According to the
Department of Justice, that mode of proceeding may be interpreted as implying
that “the United States has determined that the people of Puerto Rico may not decide
to retain the island’s current territorial status,” which would be contrary to the
Executive Branch’s longstanding view that ‘Puerto Ricans should determine
for themselves the future status of the Island’ and the federal government’s
responsibility is to facilitate ‘the desire of the people of Puerto Rico to change
status or to establish, for some period of time, that they have chosen no
change in status.’218
In so doing, the Department of Justice, as the U.S. Supreme Court in Sánchez
Valle, defended a view in tension with P3: Puerto Rico’s current status does not
find its origin in a decision of Puerto Ricans in the exercise of their inherent
sovereignty. Nonetheless, it also provided a means for the reproduction of the
basic structure of territoriality—the inclusion of the status quo (with its
fundamental legal rules) as a legitimate “self-determination” option.
IV. CHALLENGING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF TERRITORIALITY
The previous Part described what we have called the basic structure of territoriality
and examined a series of events that brought to light its internal contradictions. Except
for the adoption of PROMESA in 2016, those events left the basic structure intact. In
the exercise of its legal sovereignty over the island, the U.S. Congress, through the
adoption of PROMESA, unilaterally reduced the force of the Constitution of 1952.
What would happen if, in the exercise of their claimed political sovereignty over the
island, Puerto Ricans attempted to unilaterally replace its internal constitution, to
exercise the constituent authority that they may have failed to exercise during the
1950-1952 process? And what if that replacement expressly violated the conditions
established by the U.S. Congress and contained in the Constitution of 1952’s eternity
clause? Or, even more dramatically (and unlikely), what if the Puerto Rican legislature
issues a unilateral declaration of independence? The basic structure of territoriality,
after all, is not normatively neutral; it protects a relationship that, like all colonial
relationships, is based on a radical negation of a basic democratic principle. That is,
that a people should only be subject to norms created by themselves, either directly or
through their elected representatives.

216 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SELF DETERMINATION ACT, supra note 210.
217 Id.
218 Id.
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Constituent Power and Constitutional Replacement

In order to answer those questions, two key constitutional theory concepts need to
be introduced: the notion of constituent power and that of constitutional replacement.
Contrary to conventional thinking, constitutions do not last very long. In fact, Elkins,
Ginsburg, and Melton have shown that “the median survival time (the age at which
one-half of constitutions are expected to have died) is nineteen years.” 219 There are
various factors that influence the endurance of constitutions, such as social and
environmental changes, wars, economic crises, and design features. 220 What is of
interest to us at this point is not why constitutions are replaced but how. Some
constitutions are created (or fundamentally transformed) in revolutionary
circumstances, after a break in the previous constitutional order or during state
building.221 In such a revolutionary setting, the constitution-making body— the holder
of constitution-making authority—acts without pre-existing constitution-making rules
or simply ignores them.222 This ex nihilo type of constitution-making has been present
in many states, especially in Latin America, where formally illegal constituent
assemblies have been frequently convened.223 The formation of the U.S. Constitution
itself was famously a constitutional replacement of the Articles of the Confederation
rather than an amendment to them, as the Founders acted in violation of the original
mandate and the required procedure.224
From the French Revolution onwards, the concept of constituent power (a
constitution-making power) that exists outside the constitutional order and that can
always reappear to replace the constitution with a new one, has been highly influential
in some constitutional traditions.225 Indeed, the replacement of an existing
constitution usually presumes the exercise of an original constituent power (in a
democratic context, a power held by ‘the people’), unlimited by any forms or
procedures. Such a power, it is said, is not bound by the constitution’s basic

219 ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 129 (2009).
220 See generally id.
221 Andrew Arato, Conventions, Constituent Assemblies, and Round Tables: Models,
Principles and Elements of Democratic Constitution-Making, 1 GLOB. CONSTITUTIONALISM
173, 175–76 (2012).
222 CLAUDE KLEIN & ANDRÁS SAJÓ, Constitution-Making: Process and Substance, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 419, 421–22 (Michel Rosenfeld
& András Sajó eds., 2012).
223 Id. at 426–31.
224 Richard S. Kay, The Illegality of The Constitution, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 57, 67–68 (1987).
On the concept of constituent power in American thinking, see Jason Frank, “Unauthorized
Propositions:” The Federalist Papers and Constituent Power, 37 DIACRITICS, no. 2-3, 2007, at
103, 103-04; William Partlett, The American Tradition of Constituent Power, 15 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 955, 965–67 (2017).
225 See LUCIA RUBINELLI, CONSTITUENT POWER: A HISTORY 1–3 (2020). On the various
theoretical approaches to constituent power, see, for example, MIKAEL SPÅNG, CONSTITUENT
POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: ABOVE, WITHIN AND BESIDE THE CONSTITUTION (2014).
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structure.226 This original constituent power, which is said to rest in a legally unlimited
people, is distinguished from the legally regulated amendment authority, which can
aspire to no more than being a derived constituent power.227 But not all constitutions
are created ex nihilo - de la nada, or out of nothing. Constitution-making processes,
as the experience in South Africa demonstrates, may take place within certain predetermined procedural and substantive rules.228 Others may be regulated by rules
imposed by foreign, external, or occupying forces, as in the cases of Japan, Germany,
or Iraq.229 Moreover, some constitutions (like the Chilean one after the 2019
amendments) contain rules for their own replacement, aiming to regulate the future
exercise of the constituent authority.230 It would be difficult to argue that, in the
previously mentioned countries (i.e., South Africa, Japan, etc.), old constitutions were
not replaced with new ones just because there was not a breach in legal continuity.
That is to say, constitutional replacement does not always need to involve what
Hans Kelsen famously called a change in the Grundnorm or a “revolution in the legal
sense,”231 or what, more recently, Gabriel Negretto has called a “disruption of

226 The ability of constituent power to act outside of positive law goes in one line of thought
from Sieyès to Schmitt. See EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYÈS, What is the Third Estate?, in POLITICAL
WRITINGS 136 (Michael Sonenscher ed., 2003); CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 132
(Jeffrey Seitzer ed., trans. 2008).
227 For a discussion of the distinction between the original and the derived constituent power,
see JOEL COLÓN-RÍOS, CONSTITUENT POWER AND THE LAW 8–17 (2020).
228 For elaboration on this idea and its implication on the nature of constituent power, see
ANDREW ARATO, POST SOVEREIGN CONSTITUTION MAKING: LEARNING AND LEGITIMACY in
OXFORD CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 126 (Martin Loughlin et al. eds., 2016).
229 See, e.g., ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION MAKING UNDER OCCUPATION: THE POLITICS OF
IMPOSED REVOLUTION IN IRAQ 1–3 (2009); RICHARD ALBERT ET AL., THE LAW AND LEGITIMACY
OF IMPOSED CONSTITUTIONS 1–3 (2019).
230 See, e.g., David Landau & Rosalind Dixon, Constraining Constitutional Change, 50
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 859, 880 (2015); GABRIEL L. NEGRETTO, REDRAFTING CONSTITUTIONS IN
DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 1–2 (2020).
231 Kelsen states:
It is just the phenomenon of revolution which clearly shows the significance of the
basic norm. Suppose that a group of individuals attempt to seize power by force, in
order to remove the legitimate government in a hitherto monarchic State, and to
introduce a republican form of government. If they succeed, if the old order ceases,
and the new order begins to be efficacious, because the individuals whose behavior
the new order regulates actually behave, by and large, in conformity with the new
order, then this order is considered as a valid order. It is now according to this new
order that the actual behavior of individuals is interpreted as legal or illegal. But this
means that a new basic norm is presupposed. It is no longer the norm according to
which the old monarchical constitution is valid, but a norm according to which the
new republican constitution is valid, a norm endowing the revolutionary government
with legal authority. If the revolutionaries fail, if the order they have tried to establish
remains inefficacious, then, on the other hand, their undertaking is interpreted, not as
a legal, a law-creating act, as the establishment of a constitution, but as an illegal act,
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constitutional legality.”232 The rules contained in a constitution for the exercise of the
amending authority (or the derived constituent power) can be strictly followed, but in
order to adopt changes that repudiate the constitution’s essential features, destroys its
foundations, and transforms its identity (i.e., its basic structure).233 These are the types
of changes captured by the “substitution doctrine” adopted by the Colombian
Constitutional Court in its famous 2003 judgment,234 and by what Richard Albert has
more recently termed “constitutional dismemberment:” constitutional amendments
that are “self-conscious efforts to repudiate the essential characteristics of the
constitution and to destroy its foundations.”235 Rather than being relatively minor
adjustments seeking to better realize the purpose of the existing constitution, they
“dismantle [its] basic structure.”236 Constitutional replacement, then, occurs when the
basic structure of the established constitution is altered (e.g., through the adoption of
a new constitution or the radical alteration of the existing one) either legally or
illegally.237
B.

The U.S. Congress as Constituent Authority

At the very bottom of a colonial relationship, the negation of democracy is
expressed in the identity of the constituent subject, in the fact that constituent power
is not held by the people to which the constitutional order applies.238 This is why it is

as the crime of treason, and this according to the old monarchic constitution and its
specific basic norm.
See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 118 (1945).
232 GABRIEL L. NEGRETTO, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS: PRESIDENTS, PARTIES, AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE IN LATIN AMERICA 19 (2013) [hereinafter NEGRETTO, MAKING
CONSTITUTIONS]; see also Gabriel L. Negretto, Replacing and Amending Constitutions: The
Logic of Constitutional Change in Latin America, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 749, 758 (2012)
[hereinafter Negretto, Replacing and Amending Constitutions].
233 NEGRETTO, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 232, at 15–16.
234 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], La Sala Plena Julio 9, 2003, Sentencia
C-551/03 (Colom.).
235 Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment, 43 YALE J. INT’L. L. 1,
2–3 (2018).
236 Id. at 3.
237 In a similar vein, it has recently been argued that the formal notion behind “legal
revolutions” should be abandoned in favor of a substantive one that focuses not on the process
of the constitutional change but on its substance, and to inquire whether it resulted in a paradigm
shift in the way by which constitutionalism is experienced in that given polity, regardless of
how the change has occurred. Consider, for example the Hungarian transformation from
communism to a liberal democracy by use of the formal amendment procedure. Surely even
without a break in legal continuity, one can understand that the constitutional order has been
revolutionized and effectively replaced with a new one. GARY J. JACOBSOHN & YANIV ROZNAI,
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 59–65 (2020).
238 For a discussion of these different doctrines, see Joel I. Colón-Ríos, Five Conceptions of
Constituent Power, 130 LAW Q. REV. 306, 306 (2014).
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not surprising that the British Empire gave rise to new ideas about the nature of
constituent authority in its overseas colonies and dominions.239 For example, in 1929,
Arthur Berriedale Keith referred to colonial legislatures’ “inability to exercise the
unfettered constituent power which belongs to the Parliament of the United
Kingdom.”240 To the extent that some colonial legislatures were authorized to alter
some aspects of the constitution given by the Imperial Parliament, they were seen as
possessing a degree of constituent power.241 Such power, however, was equivalent to
the power of amending a constitution (not of replacing the existing one), and its scope
could be limited by the ultimate constituent authority, that is, the imperial
legislature.242 According to Keith, colonial legislatures sometimes had “a mere
scintilla of constituent power,” as their power of constitutional change frequently
extended only to some provisions of the colonial constitution (and not to the most
important ones).243
In 1900 and 1917 and, arguably, in 1950-1952, the U.S. Congress exercised in
Puerto Rico the “unfettered constituent power” that Keith attributed to the
Westminster Parliament.244 By adopting the Foraker Act in 1900 and the Jones Act in
1917, the U.S. Congress assumed the role of a constituent assembly. It gave Puerto
Rico its two first written constitutions under United States rule (the Spanish Cortes
had given Puerto Rico its very first constitution in 1897).245 In 1950 the situation was
different. The U.S. Congress did not act as a constituent assembly; that is, did not
engage itself in the activity of drafting a constitution, but rather authorized the
convocation of a constitution-making body in Puerto Rico. The question is whether,
in so doing, it abdicated its constituent authority over the island in favor of the Puerto
Rican people or if, on the contrary, it retained its original constituent power and simply
used the Puerto Rican Constituent Convention as a sort of drafting committee (or, at
most, as a derived constituent power). 246 If the latter, the Constituent Convention
would have been a means for the exercise of the constituent power of the U.S.
Congress, not of that of the Puerto Rican people.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Sánchez Valle is not of great help here for
a simple reason: the identity of the constituent subject can change.247 The fact that the
239 Id. at 6.
240 ARTHUR BERRIEDALE KEITH, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS 197 (1929).
241 Id. at 197–98.
242 Id. at 198.
243 Id. at 199.
244 Id. at 197.
245 For a discussion, see Colón-Ríos, supra note 25, 16–21.
246 See Gordon K. Lewis, Puerto Rico: A New Constitution in American Government, 15 J.
POL. 42, 44 (1953) (expressing that “[t]he constituent-power created by the Congressional grant,
however, was restricted by certain requirements contained in Public Law 600.”).
247 This is not to confuse with the identity of the constitutional subject, that can also change.
See, e.g., MICHEL ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUBJECT: SELFHOOD,
CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE, AND COMMUNITY 209 (2010). The identity of the constituent subject can
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Puerto Rican legal system has its legal origins in an act of the U.S. Congress does not
necessarily mean that the U.S. Congress is, today (or will be tomorrow), the island’s
constituent subject. After all, the Spanish Cortes once exercised constituent authority
over the island and, in 1898, such authority arguably laid with the President as
Commander in Chief of the U.S. military and not in the federal legislature. 248 A
change in the identity of a constituent subject would almost always entail the illegal
alteration of a constitutional order’s basic structure (i.e., one of the modalities
constitutional replacement discussed above), a revolution in the legal sense, or a
change in the Grundnorm. The classic example, given by Kelsen,249 would be that of
a popular revolution that results in the illegal replacement or a monarchical
constitution with a republican one.
It is nonetheless clear that there was no legal revolution and no break in the chain
of legal continuity in Puerto Rico in 1950-1952. The process for altering the existing
constitution (i.e., the Jones Act) was followed by the U.S. Congress (i.e., the ordinary
law-making process) and the Puerto Rican authorities complied, at every single step,
with the procedures and conditions contained in Public Law 600. If, for example, the
Constituent Convention had refused to comply with the U.S. Congress’ requirement
to alter the draft constitution and had been able to impose its will, the identity of Puerto
Rico’s constituent power (at that moment in time) would at least have been up for
debate.250 That, however, did not happen. Moreover, even if there was a plausible
argument that in 1950-1952, the Puerto Rican people exercised their constituent
authority,251 the adoption of PROMESA in 2016 would nonetheless suggest that the

change, for example, from a divine authority of the emperor to a popular sovereignty of the
people, as in Japan. See CHAIHARK HAHM & SUNG HO KIM, MAKING WE THE PEOPLE:
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDING IN POSTWAR JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA 7 (2015).
248 A similar point is made by Issacharoff et al., supra note 6, at 21.
249 KELSEN, supra note 231, at 118.
250 When these conditions were considered at the Constituent Convention, Muñoz Marín
expressed (with respect to the U.S. Congress’ refusal to accept the inclusion of social and
economic rights into the bill of rights) that given that those provisions were not legally
enforceable, their removal was not a problem. But he added (to the applause of his colleagues)
that if the Constituent Convention’s intention had been to make them legally enforceable, “we
would not accept to eliminate Section 20 even if that meant that the constitution would not enter
into effect.” DIARIO, supra note 30, at 3129.
251 Issacharoff et al. think they did:
The authority to make that choice [to decide on a constitutional order] is an attribute
of sovereignty reserved to the constituent power, in this case the critical decisions by
the citizens of Puerto Rico to enter into this new relationship by overwhelmingly
endorsing their new constitutional arrangements in 1952. The constituent power of
the new commonwealth arrangement was exercised in the decision of the people of
Puerto Rico to take the first affirmative steps of adopting the formal relationship with
the United States. The Court in Sánchez Valle offered no account of why sovereign
status could not emerge during the reformulation of political relations as part of the
process of decolonization.
Issacharoff et al., supra note 6, at 24.
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identity of the constituent power had reverted to the U.S. Congress. PROMESA is, at
least in one sense, “revolutionary” with respect to the Constitution of 1952 because it
altered the jurisdiction of constitutionally regulated authorities (e.g., it severely limited
both the authority of the island’s Governor and legislature) without following the
amending process contained in it.
Nonetheless, note that we said that PROMESA was revolutionary at least in one
sense. If one understands the Constitution of 1952 as a based act of the U.S. Congress
(Public Law 600), then the adoption of PROMESA was entirely consistent with it.
That is to say, just as any ordinary federal law, Public Law 600 could be repealed by
a subsequent federal law (which would mean the Constitution of 1952 would arguably
cease to exist).252 Moreover, a federal law inconsistent with Public Law 600, or with
the constitution it authorizes, would implicitly repeal any conflicting provisions.
Under this approach, the U.S. Congress would find itself, with respect to Puerto Rico,
as at once “a legislative and a constituent assembly.”253 This does not seem to be very
far from the truth: while the eternity clause contained in Article VII of the U.S.
Constitution would render illegal any attempt by Puerto Rico to change its political
status unilaterally, the same would not seem to be the case, for example, of a federal
law granting full independence to the island. Such a law would probably be seen as a
legally valid exercise of congressional authority under the Territorial Clause, that is,
an exercise of the power “to dispose” of territory.254
This view is also exemplified in the debate about whether the U.S. Congress could
legally repeal the Constitution of 1952. That debate began in the Constituent
Convention itself, when some delegates argued that, even if, morally speaking, the
U.S. Congress should not be able to unilaterally change or repeal the constitution the
Convention was drafting, there were no legal obstacles preventing it from doing so.255
David M. Helfeld, a leading Puerto Rican law scholar, expressed a similar approach
in an early article on the new constitution: “[c]onstitutionally, Congress may repeal
Public Law 600, [and] annul the Constitution of Puerto Rico . . . . From the perspective
of [c]onstitutional law the compact between Puerto Rico and Congress may be
unilaterally altered by the Congress.”256 In fact, a suggestion that the U.S. Congress
would not be able to unilaterally alter the constitution adopted under Public Law 600
and that the authorization to draft a new constitution amounted to an “irrevocable

252 Compare Figueroa v. Puerto Rico, where a U.S. court of appeals expressed that “the
constitution of the Commonwealth is not just another Organic Act of Congress,” even if
“congressional approval was necessary to launch it forth.” 232 F.2d 615, 620 (1st Cir. 1956).
253 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 74 (1956).
254 This seems to be a natural implication of the Territorial Clause itself, and was recognized
by the PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON PUERTO RICO’S STATUS, REPORT: LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
OPTIONS FOR PUERTO RICO’S STATUS 6 (2005). “The Federal Government may relinquish United
States sovereignty by granting independence or ceding the territory to another nation; or it may,
as the Constitution provides, admit a territory as a State, thus making the Territory Clause
inapplicable.” Id.
255 Diario, supra note 30, at 460, 543.
256 David Helfeld, Congressional Intent and Attitude Towards Public Law 600, and the
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 21 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 255, 307 (1952).
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delegation of [the U.S. Congress’] constitutional authority,” led to the federal
legislature’s decision to require the addition of the previously mentioned eternity
clause to the Constitution of 1952.257
More recently, a Presidential Task Force report on Puerto Rico’s status noted that
“as long as Puerto Rico remains a territory, its system is subject to revision by
Congress” and that this view reflects “the general rule that one legislature cannot bind
a subsequent one.”258 The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico agreed with that approach
in 2015, noting that “Congress may allow the Commonwealth to remain as a political
system indefinitely,” or it could “amend or repeal the internal administrative powers
that the Government of Puerto Rico currently exercises.” 259 The contrary view has
nonetheless been defended.260 For example, in 1954, the U.S. delegation informed the
U.N. that the compact with Puerto Rico was only changeable “by common
consent.”261 Prior to the previously quoted decision, Puerto Rican courts had
expressed that the island’s governmental powers emanate from its people and are not
merely delegated by the U.S. Congress.262 More recently, in a dissenting opinion,
Justice Sotomayor expressed that “there is a legitimate question whether Congress
could validly repeal any element of its earlier compact with Puerto Rico on its own

257 Torruella, supra note 1, at 82–84.
258 REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON PUERTO RICO’S STATUS 5–6 (2007). This
view is sometimes challenged using the recognition of Philippine independence as an example.
See, e.g., Issacharoff et al., supra note 6, at 14; see also Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 579 U.S.
59, 80 (2016) (Breyer J., dissenting). That is to say, if it is true that the U.S. Congress cannot
bind itself, how come it cannot now legislate for the Philippines? Regardless of what may be
the answer to the general question about whether the U.S. Congress can bind itself, the
recognition of the independence of the Philippines is not a good example. In that case, a legal
revolution (i.e., a change in Grundnorm or a break in the chain of legal continuity) took place,
so any analogy with the U.S. Congress’ legislative power over an entity that remains it territory,
fails. For a general discussion of the question, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665–66 (2002). More generally, see
JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 118–22
(2010).
259 Pueblo v. Sánchez Valle, 192 P.R. Dec. 594, 641 (2015); see also United States v.
Sánchez, 992 F.2d 1143, 1152–53 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Congress may unilaterally repeal the
Puerto Rican Constitution…and replace [it] with any rules or regulations of its choice.”).
260 For a recent academic argument about the U.S. Congress’s inability to repeal the
Constitution of 1952, see Adam W. McCall, Why Congress Cannot Unilaterally Repeal Puerto
Rico’s Constitution, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1367, 1368 (2017).
261 H. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 83D CONG., EIGHT SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
U.N. 241 (Comm. Print 1954) (written by Reps. Frances P. Bolton and James P.
Richards)). Interestingly, in the early case of Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 135 (1810), it was
noted: “When, then, a law is in its nature a contract, when absolute rights have vested under that
contract, a repeal of the law cannot devest [sic] those rights.”
OF THE

262 Ramírez de Ferrer v. Mari Brás, 144 P.R. Dec. 141, 156–58 (1997); Pueblo v.
Figueroa, 77 P.R. Dec. 188, 196–97 (1954).
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initiative.”263 Even if that is a legitimate question, at least for now, it seems the official
answer is that it can. As such, there is little doubt that it is in the federal legislature
where the island’s constituent power is located, a situation entirely consistent with the
previously described basic structure of territoriality.
C.

Reclaiming Constituent Power

The identity of Puerto Rico’s constituent subject, then, is to be currently found in
Washington D.C., and not in the island. The events of 1950-1952 did not change that
reality. That does not mean, however, that that reality cannot change. Imagine, for
example, that the Puerto Rican legislature passes a resolution convening a new
Constituent Convention, and that the convention decides to alter the Constitution of
1952 in the following way. First, it proposes the removal of the eternity clause required
by the U.S. Congress which, among other things, prohibits the reinsertion into the
constitutional text of the social and economic rights provisions originally included as
Section 20 of the Bill of Rights. Second, that if the removal of the eternity clause is
approved by the electorate in a referendum, Section 20 would once again become part
of the constitution. Would that action be constitutionally valid? There are at least three
main argumentative lines that could be developed in response to that question. The
first one is the weakest of the three: that because the eternity clause is contained in
Section 3, Article VII is not self-entrenched (i.e., it does not protect itself against the
amending power) and there is nothing preventing a Constituent Convention from
removing it and then proceeding to make the desired (and previously prohibited)
change.
According to this argument, if an eternity clause is not self-entrenched, the
protected principles or provisions may simply be amended in a double amendment
maneuver by, firstly, repealing the provision prohibiting certain amendments, and,
secondly, amending the previously “eternal” principle or provision, which would no
longer be protected from amendments.264 One may even argue that two-stages are not
required and the repeal can be made in a single act.265 This kind of argument has been
considered in the American,266 as well as in French267 and Norwegian268 academic
literature about potential limits to constitutional amendments. It has also been put in
practice. For example, in 1989, against the backdrop of the collapse of communism

263 Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1677
(2020).
264 Virgílio Afonso Da Silva, A Fossilised Constitution?, 17 RATIO JURIS. 454, 456–58
(2004).
265 Douglas Linder, What in the Constitution Cannot Be Amended?, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 717,
729 (1981) (claiming that “only a hidebound formalist would contend that the difference
[between one and two amendments] is significant.”).
266 See discussion in LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 111–114 (3d ed.
2000); LESTER B. ORFIELD, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 83–85 (1942).
267 GEORGE A. BERMANN & ETIENNE PICARD, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 13 (2008).
268 Eivind Smith, Old and Protected? On the “Supra-Constitutional” Clause in the
Constitution of Norway, 44 ISR. L. REV. 369, 375 (2011).
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and in order to comply with the European Community’s norms, the eternity clause in
the Portuguese Constitution of 1976 (Art. 288)—which is not self-entrenched—was
itself amended, and the principle of “collective ownership of the means of production”
was removed.269 Although the removal “shocked” constitutional scholars, as it
undermined the idea behind eternity clauses,270 the Portuguese court was never asked
to review its constitutionality.271
In the case of the Constitution of 1952, it is even less likely for that argument to
be successful. First, unlike in most contexts, the part of the eternity clause that
prohibits the reinsertion of Section 20 was required by the U.S. Congress acting as the
ultimate constituent authority.272 Thus, one could not argue that (1) eternity clauses
only bind the ordinary power of constitutional reform, and not the original constituent
power; (2) therefore, the removal of the relevant clause of Article VII and the
subsequent reinsertion of Section 20 in the Bill of Rights by a Constitutional
Convention (the usual means to exercise the original constituent power) would not
present a problem. Second, and relatedly, part of the content protected by the eternity
clause (e.g. Public Law 600, Public Law 447, the PRFRA) did not originate in Puerto
Rico.273 That is to say, unlike in most scenarios, it would not be possible to argue that
because the protected content was created by the very same type of entity now tasked
with the revision of the constitution (i.e. a Constituent Convention), it must be
changeable it (i.e., “the very mouth that proscribed also permitted”).274 In short, the
“lack of self-entrenchment” argument is doomed to fail.
The second argumentative line would negate, from a strictly legal perspective, the
constitutional validity of a potential reinsertion of Section 20. Section 3 of Article VII
is extremely clear in this respect. The relevant content is protected not only against
amendments but against revisions, that is, the type of constitutional change that the
Constitution of 1952 authorizes a Constituent Convention to engage in. Going beyond
that eternity clause, from this perspective, would be ultra vires Article VII of the
constitution and involve what we earlier called a constitutional replacement.
This is where the third argument would come into play. It is the most controversial
argument of the three, as it rests on the notion that Puerto Rico’s claims to political
sovereignty can lead to a change in the identity of the constituent subject. The main
idea here is that the identity of the constituent subject is not determined by law. Rather,

269 See VÍCTOR FERRERES COMELLA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES: A
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 207–08, n. 39 (2009).
270 Paulo Ferreira Da Cunha, Constitutional Sociology and Politics: Theories and Memories,
5 SILESIAN J. LEG. STUD. 11, 25 (2013).
271 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Report on
Constitutional Amendment, Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 81st Plenary Session, at
42, CDL-AD(2010)001 (Dec. 11-12, 2009).
272 Torruella, supra note 1, at 81–85.
273 See generally Helfeld, supra note 256.
274 Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot, 22a. Usually, this approach would not deprive the eternity
clause of any effects, as it would still be enforceable against the ordinary amendment process
(under the Constitution of 1952, a two-thirds legislative majority plus a referendum).
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it is ultimately about who is able to effectively engage in an act of constitutional
replacement; in the abandonment of the basic structure of the constitutional order or,
in this case, of the basic structure of territoriality.
Under this view, to argue in favor or against the legality of the reinsertion of
Section 20 to the Bill of Rights is to misunderstand the question being asked, which
requires one to inquire into whether the institutions that would be in a position to
declare the change invalid would in fact do so. One could imagine that if the
Constituent Convention’s proposal is subject to a judicial challenge (and any obstacles
regarding legal standing are overcome), courts may decide that the exercise of the
power of constitutional reform is not subject to judicial review, 275 or that, if it is, that
given Section 20 is not judicially enforceable, its validity is in the end is a political
and not a legal question to be answered by judges.276 The board created under
PROMESA would also be in a position to prevent the adoption of this hypothetical
change, but, once again, the non-enforceable nature of Section 20 would give the board
good reasons to allow it (probably noting that all future ordinary laws seeking to
realize social and economic rights would need to comply with the approved Fiscal
Plan). If any of those things happened, and the Constituent Convention was able to
revise the constitution despite the limits on its power of constitutional reform, the
identity of the island’s constituent subject could, arguably, have reverted to Puerto
Ricans.
If such a situation were to eventuate, the Constituent Convention would have
unilaterally replaced the basic structure of territoriality: it would not have only gone
well beyond P2, but violated (and arguably abrogated) two of the fundamental legal
rules that comprise the relationship’s basic structure—R5 (“The power to reform the
constitution of Puerto Rico, even when exercised by a Constituent Convention, is
permanently subject to a series of material limits contained in the resolution approving
the draft constitution and in Public Law 600”) and R7 (“The power to reform the
constitution cannot be used to change any of the fundamental legal rules that regulate
the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico”). Even though, by itself,
Section 20 would not have a direct effect in the nature of the relationship between
Puerto Rico and the United States (e.g., U.S. laws would continue to apply in the
island), its adoption would signal an important change in the basic structure of
territoriality, resulting in a rebalancing of the underlying tension between legal and

275 On the objection of courts to review constitutional reforms, see Richard Albert et al., The
Formalist Resistance to Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 639,
642 (2019) (analyzing the jurisprudence of three jurisdictions—France, Georgia and Turkey—
and showing how and why courts and constitution-designers there expressly rejected the
doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment on formal grounds).
276 For example, as a comparison note, the U.S. Supreme Court has understood constitutional
amendment processes to only raise “political questions.” See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,
459 (1939), in which the majority deemed the amendment process a political question not
subject to judicial review. As Judge Black wrote: “Article V . . . grants power over the amending
of the Constitution to Congress alone . . . . [T]he process itself is ‘political’ in its entirety, from
submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial
guidance, control or interference at any point.” See generally Walter F. Dodd, Judicially NonEnforcible Provisions of Constitutions, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 54, 89–90 (1931); Marty Haddad,
Substantive Content of Constitutional Amendments: Political Question of Justiciable Concern?,
42 WAYNE L. REV. 1685, 1685 (1996).
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political sovereignty. From then on, Puerto Rican claims to political sovereignty (and
potential unilateral exercises of political power based on those claims) would have a
much stronger basis.
Consider now a more dramatic, and at the moment rather unlikely, example: a
unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by the Puerto Rican legislature. Unlike
in the Section 20 example, the issue here would be that any challenge against that
action (an action that is clearly illegal from the perspective of the basic structure of
territoriality, violating all of its rules and principles), would be confronted not only
with Puerto Rican claims to an ultimate political sovereignty over the island, but with
the right to self-determination under international law.277 This is why, despite its
clearly illegal nature (even more so than the reinsertion of Section 20 into the Bill of
Rights), it is not unthinkable that it might succeed. But whether it would succeed or
not would arguably be determined not by the application of the relevant domestic legal
rules, but it would instead depend on whether the United States is willing to negate
the island’s international right to become an independent nation, as well as on the
reaction of the broader international community. If, as a result of a UDI, Puerto Rico
does become an independent country, the debate about the identity of its constituent
subject would be over. In fact, independence would probably be followed by a new
constituent process and a new constitution.
Consider now an intermediate possibility, one falling somewhere between the
reinsertion of Section 20 into the constitutional text and a UDI. Imagine that a
Constituent Convention called under Article VII revises the Constitution of 1952 in
order to limit the applicability of U.S. laws in the island. For example, it proposes to
the electorate a provision stating: “Notwithstanding Article VII of this constitution
and Section 9 of the PRFRA, Puerto Ricans will only be subject to laws adopted by
the Puerto Rican legislature. A U.S. law will only apply in Puerto Rico if its legislature
issues a resolution consenting to its application.” This change would not only violate
the eternity clause of Article VII, but also (R3) (“With the exception of internal
revenue laws, U.S. federal laws, unless locally inapplicable, apply in Puerto Rico”) as
well as R5, R7, and while taking the principle of consent to a new level, it would
radically abandon the principle of subordination. In short, such a change would
amount to a clear replacement of the basic structure of territoriality and, much more
than the mere reinsertion of Section 20, it would make clear that the island’s
constitutional order is based on a decision of a Puerto Rican constituent subject.
Not surprisingly, it is very difficult to imagine that this would survive a judicial
challenge. On the one hand, the options available to a court in the case of Section 20
(i.e., treating it as a political question) seem irrelevant. Moreover, one of the effects
of the change would be to repudiate the very application of PROMESA to the island.
From a legal perspective, then, such a proposal seems to be a non-starter. Nonetheless,
as we have been stressing since the beginning of this Article, at the very basis of the
relationship between the island and the United States, there is a tension between legal
and political sovereignty. A proposal like this not only brings that tension to the
surface but, like a UDI, would require its solution one way or another. If it is solved
in favor of U.S. legal sovereignty, the solution would be straightforward—the

277 See, e.g., Ruben Berrios Martinez, Self-Determination and Independence: The Case of
Puerto Rico, 67 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 11, 16–17 (1973) (claiming that “[i]n the case of
Puerto Rico, this means that it cannot achieve self-determination until it attains independence.”).
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proposed change is illegal. If it is solved in favor of Puerto Rican political sovereignty,
the proposed change would replace the existing relationship with a new, arguably nonterritorial political status. This latter solution is extremely unlikely, and many would
argue (with good reasons) that such a relationship (the conditioned application of U.S.
laws to the island’s consent) is not possible under U.S. constitutional law.278
One could nonetheless ask the following: if a UDI has some actual chance of
resulting in valid law (i.e., in the creation of an independent constitutional order),
would a constitutional change as the one considered in the previous example not
trigger the same kind of debate (a debate informed by the right to self-determination)?
And if that is the case, and regardless of its immediate outcome in a court of law,
would it be really unthinkable for it to not end in a replacement in the basic structure
of territoriality, in a recognition of the Puerto Rican people’s constituent power? This
is, in the end, the nature of a relationship that, built on a tension that is meant to remain
hidden but that every now and then resurfaces, is accompanied by the always present
possibility of instability. It cannot, and should not, be any other way. From a normative
perspective, the last thing one may wish for is a colonial status that promises to
permanently and successfully reproduce itself. At least in the near future, it is highly
unlikely that any of the examples discussed above would materialize. They
nonetheless allow us to look more closely at the nature and limits of the territorial
relationship.
V. CONCLUSION
We have provided an analysis of the relationship between Puerto Rico and the
United States that, unlike most of the existing literature, goes beyond discussions of
the existing jurisprudence on the island’s political status and avoids providing merely
descriptive or justificatory accounts. Using the tools of constitutional theory, we
sought to describe the nature of what we called the “basic structure of territoriality,”
the way it reproduces itself, and the possibility of its replacement. That basic structure,
we argued, is comprised by the following fundamental legal rules:
(R1) Puerto Rico has the right to organize (and reorganize) a government
pursuant to their own constitution
(R2) The Puerto Rican government must be republican in form and be subject
to a constitutional bill of rights
(R3) With the exception of internal revenue laws, U.S. federal laws, unless
locally inapplicable, apply in Puerto Rico
(R4) Individuals born in the island are U.S. citizens
(R5) The power to reform the Constitution of 1952, even when exercised by
a Constituent Convention, is permanently subject to a series of material limits
contained in the resolution approving the draft constitution and in Public Law
600
(R6) The content of the Constitution of 1952 must always be consistent with
that of the U.S. Constitution

278 See supra note 70.
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(R7) The power to reform the constitution cannot be used to change any of
the fundamental legal rules that regulate the relationship between the U.S.
and Puerto Rico
(R8) The U.S. Congress is not always required to treat Puerto Rico as a state
(R9) In virtue of the doctrine of preemption, laws adopted by the Puerto
Rican legislature will be invalid when in conflict with federal laws
(R10) Puerto Ricans living in the island lack full political rights in the U.S.
political system
Implicit in these rules, and in the manner in which they have been applied
throughout the history of the territorial relationship, we find five principles:
(P1) principle of autonomy
(P2) principle of subordination
(P3) principle of consent
(P4) principle of passive U.S. citizenship
(P5) principle of progressive equalization
Although these principles are not legally enforceable, at least not in the same way
the previously listed fundamental legal rules are, they inform in important ways the
relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States. Whenever the island or the
U.S. Government take any action that contradicts them, a tension underlying the basic
structure of territoriality is brought to the surface—the tension between U.S. legal
sovereignty over the island and Puerto Rican historical claims of political sovereignty.
We concluded the Article with a series of thought experiments that allowed us to
address the question of the identity of Puerto Rico’s constituent subject. We argued
that, at least at the moment, there is little doubt that the island’s constitutional order is
based on the constituent power of the U.S. Congress. The adoption of Public Law 600
in 1950 did not change that reality, as the U.S. Congress has the legal authority of
unilaterally altering the terms of the relationship, and the Puerto Rican Constituent
Convention always acted under the limits established by the federal legislature.
The examples considered in the final Part of this Article suggested that, regardless
of the legal significance of the eternity clause contained in Article VII of the
Constitution of 1952 and of the legal limits created by the basic structure of
territoriality, the question of constituent power is ultimately a political and factual
question. In other words, the identity of the constituent subject cannot be prescribed
by law. In a Puerto Rican-U.S. context, it does not depend on what the fundamental
legal rules of the relationship are but, rather, on who is able to effectively (and
unilaterally) replace the basic structure of territoriality. As of now, it seems that that
entity is the U.S. Congress, whose power under the Territorial Clause of the U.S.
Constitution would even allow it to “dispose” of the territory without the consent (and
even with the objection) of Puerto Rico. That does not mean, however, that such a
situation will (or should) continue indefinitely.
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